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INTRODUCTION

“The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the
states of created beings capable of law, where there is no law, there is no freedom.”
-John Locke

Since its formation nearly 250 years ago, the United States has established itself as a beacon
of opportunity for individuals from all backgrounds. This opportunity has resulted in the
development of the United States as one of the most diverse countries in the world, with the interests
of these many individuals manifesting itself in a healthy and open economic environment.
Despite this diversity, over its history the U.S. has faced numerous hurdles when it has come
to civil rights and the legal definition and scope of individual liberties. These battles have often been
fought on a regional and state-by-state level, including: division of Confederacy and Union states
over the status of slavery and the legal definition of African American citizenship in the mid-19th
Century; women’s suffrage movement, rooted primarily in Northeastern United States, in the early
20th century; and African American Civil Rights movement born out of the prejudicial and racist
legal environment in the southeastern U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s.
With each advancement in individual rights of one demographic group, the landscape of
others’ rights is further examined— often the result of a modernizing society that experiences a
maturation of social views. The most recent demographic group to experience this change and
incremental progression of rights is Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) individuals
and unionized couples- representing 9.5 million Americans. (Williams Institute, 2015). This includes
the Supreme Court legalizing gay marriage nationwide in June of 2015 by a vote of 5-4. (New York
Times, 2015). This groundbreaking ruling has been accompanied by an overarching shift in society’s
acceptance of the LGBT community. The approval rate of same-sex marriage has more than doubled
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in the last twenty years, reaching an all time high of 60%. (Gallup, 2015). In a Pew Research Center
study, 92% of LGBT adults felt that society has grown more accepting and welcoming over the past
decade. (Pew Research Center, 2015).
Despite the evolving legal and societal changes in the LGBT movement, there continues to
be numerous instances of increase in LGBT discrimination- particularly in the areas of employment,
housing, and public accommodations. Nearly two-thirds of LGBT Americans have reported
circumstances in which they felt discriminated against. (Human Rights Campaign, 2015). As it
stands, the federal government has no clear-cut nondiscrimination protections based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, thus leaving the responsibility to the states. Many states have already
adopted nondiscrimination laws protecting residents from these forms of discrimination and
following the Supreme Courts same-sex marriage ruling, many other states and municipalities have
followed suit. In total, seventeen states and the District of Colombia and more than 200
municipalities have adopted such non-discrimination ordinances. (Freedom for All Americans,
2016). This wave of legislation has occurred in our own city, Fayetteville, Arkansas, as defined by
the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Act, or Ordinance 5781, where discrimination is prohibited on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in employment, public accommodations, property
transactions, and contractual agreements. However, this was not the first draft of a nondiscrimination
ordinance and the legality of Fayetteville’s ordinance is in question.
There still remains a solid—albeit diminishing— opposition of the LGBT movement and the
legalization of gay marriage has fueled the controversy. LGBT nondiscrimination ordinances
throughout the country have been largely controversial and in many cases are repealed through
elections or lawsuits. In cases where ordinances are approved, many states have begun to take action
on LGBT rights by superseding cities’ and local municipalities’ through legislation. This study is an
in-depth analysis of the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas’ controversial road to anti-discrimination
legislation for the LGBT community.
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PART ONE: THE RISE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN FAYETTEVILLE
Project One America
According to a survey conducted by the Williams Institute, an estimated 35% of the country’s
LGBT community lives in the South, with an estimated 79,000 adults in the state of Arkansas alone.
(Williams Research Institute, 2016). However, none of these individuals have fundamental civil rights
from discrimination because of their sexuality. Arkansas law has no consistent, state-wide
nondiscrimination protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The state is also considered
one of the most underserved states by the national LGBT movement, according to the Human Rights
Campaign, the country’s largest LGBT Civil Rights organization. The group, originally titled the Human
Rights Campaign Fund, was founded in 1980 and was one of the nation’s first political action committees
for gay and lesbian citizens. The organization removed the word “Fund” from its name in 1995 and
shifted focus from lobbying towards promoting inclusion and equality. (Human Rights Campaign, 2016).
In a strong effort to increase equality for the LGBT community in the South, the HRC created a
three-state task-force in Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas in 2014 called Project One America. The
organization, equipped with an $8.5 million budget for the next three years, began the project with the
intent to reverse the notion that Southern states are the “finish line” for LGBT civil rights. Once the states
were selected, the Human Rights Campaign began an intensive needs-assessment of each. The survey is
the largest survey of its kind in efforts to measure LGBT in Southern societies. A key finding of the
survey show that in each of the states, one quarter of the LGBT community have felt discriminated
against in certain business transactions.
In an individual state assessment, the quantitative survey of 979 LGBT respondents in Arkansas
reported that half had experienced discrimination on the street, 37% reported of harassment at work and
one quarter had experienced employment discrimination. In the workplace, 37% of LGBT workers
responded that they are not publically open with their colleagues in fear that they will not be considered
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for promotions, advancements, or development opportunities. The discrimination is not just at work—
43% reported to experience discrimination in public establishments; 45% reported having faced
discrimination in school; and 18% reported monthly or more discrimination at various houses of worship.
The survey also found that LGBT citizens are important members of the communities. 58% of the
survey respondents have called Arkansas home for over 20 years; 53% of the LGBT respondents
volunteer in their community; and 60% donate money to charities and non-profit organizations. The
survey also found that 1/3 of respondents were people of faith. (Human Rights Campaign, 2014).

Analysis and Passage of Ordinance 5703 and Chapter 119

Less than two weeks after the Human Rights Campaign’s report was released to the public in July
2014, measures were being taken by local municipalities throughout Arkansas. With no clear and definite
state anti-discrimination laws or protections for the LGBT community, cities and counties throughout the
state began discussions of taking action. On July 15 2014, the Fayetteville City Council introduced and
held the first reading for a potential ordinance that would amend the city’s code to provide protections for
all citizens from ‘unfair discrimination.’ The ordinance, Ordinance 5703, called for the enactment of a
new Chapter into the city code, Chapter 119 – Civil Rights Administration. To see a copy of the proposed
Ordinance 5703 and Chapter 119, see Appendix A.

§ 119.01 - § 119.02 Purpose and Definitions
The purpose of the proposed legislation cited was to “protect and safeguard the right and
opportunity of all persons to be free from discrimination based on real or perceived race, ethnicity,
national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, familial status, marital status,
socioeconomic background, religion, sexual orientation, disability and veteran status.” The act cites
specific instances such as employment, housing and rental transactions, and public accommodation
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transactions that should be available to all citizens without discrimination. Additionally, the act was
intended to “promote the public health and welfare” of all individuals who work or live within the city.
Following the purpose of the bill, §119.02 includes relevant definitions of terms used throughout
the ordinance. The definitions given are not a complete set of definitions for the entire ordinance, but
rather a specific selection of terms that may need more interpretation. Some definitions are fairly straight
forward, such as definitions for “Business Establishment,” “Employer,” and “Employee.” However, the
ordinance also includes its intended interpretations for terms without concise and comprehensive
definitions. “Discriminate, Discrimination or Discriminatory,” consists of “any act, policy or practice that
has the effect of subjecting any person to differential treatment” due to a person’s attributes or
characteristic listed in the ordinance. Of those listed attributes and characteristics, definitions are given for
those subject to a variety of interpretations. “Gender” is defined as an individual’s “actual or perceived
sex.” Finally, there are the two definitions for the controversial terms that are seldom used in Arkansas
legal code – gender identity and sexual orientation. The ordinance defines gender identity as “a person’s
gender-related identity, whether or not that identity is or is perceived to be different from that traditionally
associated with the sex assigned to that individual at birth.” Sexual orientation is defined as “actual or
perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality.” See Appendix A.

§ 119.03 to § 119.06 Prohibited Acts of Discrimination
The ordinance lists a number of discriminatory actions that would be considered unlawful for an
employer or labor organization to conduct, completely or partially, throughout employment procedures
for a “discriminatory reason.” Such acts include the failure or refusal to hire and the firing of employees;
discrimination in relation to ‘compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or employment,’ including
promotions; to discriminate against an individual’s “admission to, or employment in,” any training or
apprentice program; to print or publish discriminatory notices or advertisements; and to make
discriminatory referrals regarding an individual in the employment process. Also, the ordinance bans
actions that would deprive an individual of employment opportunities, limit potential employment
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opportunities and or in any way result in an adverse affect for the prospective employee’s application.
The ordinance then lists a number of discriminatory actions that would be considered unlawful if
conducted by parties within housing and real estate transactions. This subsection includes actions taken
throughout the sale and lease transactions for a reason that is either partially or entirely discriminatory.
Such acts include discrimination in the form of “impeding, delaying, discouraging, or.. limiting or
restricting transaction in real estate;” “imposing different terms on real estate transactions;” and to give
the perception that “an interest in real estate is not available for transactions” due to a discriminatory
reason.
Finally, the ordinance declares that for all business establishments and accommodations that are
intended for public use, it is illegal to disallow “directly or indirectly, any person the full enjoyment of the
goods, services and facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations” due to discriminatory reasons.
This is the sole section of the bill that makes it illegal to refuse service for discriminatory purposes. The
ordinance is binding on the City of Fayetteville and its employees; city government, employees and
contractors conducting business with the municipality are held to the same standard as individuals and
businesses. After its introduction, the ordinance was amended to include a general exemption for religious
beliefs after there was public backlash from local religious institutions. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014). Also
included in the exemptions are procedures regarding a “bona fide” affirmative action policy and
occupational qualifications. See Appendix A.

§ 119.07 and § 119.11 — General Exemptions and Administration and Enforcement
The ordinance provides exemptions in which individuals and entities may be able to act in a way
that violates Chapter 119 and its provisions. The ordinance states that the chapter does not pertain to any
“federal, state or county government office or officer, or any public educational institution within the
City.” In addition, practices that may ordinarily be deemed by the ordinance as discriminatory may be
exempt if it is an effort to carry out an affirmative action policy by a law. There is also an exemption to
protect the freedom of religion and speech for practices of a “permissible bona fide religious or
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denominational preference” but that they must demonstrate there is burden of proof that “the
discrimination is in fact a necessary result of such a bona fide condition.”
Complaint procedures, administration and enforcement of the ordinance are stated to be overseen
by the Mayor. In order to carry out each of these functions, the ordinance creates the position of the Civil
Rights Administrator. The position, appointed by the Mayor of the city, would hold the responsibility of
“receiving, investigating, and conciliating complaints filed under [Chapter 119].” As it did not prepare a
mock complaint form, the administrator is to carry out the responsibility for that as well. Complaints must
be received by the administrator’s office no later than six months after the most recent discrimination
offense. Once received, the administrator “should first attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice or
practices through conciliation and meditation.” If an attempted resolution is deemed unsuccessful and the
accused discriminating party was not found to act in “good faith, the complaint may be immediately
referred to the City Prosecutor’s office.” See Appendix A.

1.4 Road to the Vote – Response, Public Opinion, and Referendum

Initial Response
When Ordinance 5703 was introduced during its second reading on the August 5, 2014 city
council meeting, member of the council listened for hours to public feedback. The first reactions to the
ordinance were those in opposition. The primary argument of those against the ordinance was that it
infringed upon their First Amendment rights by prohibiting the freedom to express their religious beliefs
and faith. In response, the council proposed an amendment to the ordinance to provide an exemption for
religious institutions. However, even with the religious exemption, opposition was still strong. Other
arguments claimed that the ordinance was equivalent to “opening a door for pedophiles and sexual
predators.” Some residents questioned whether the discrimination actually existed and asked for specific
examples. A majority of the opposed respondents were leaders of religious organizations, with very few
individuals speaking in favor of the legislation. After hours of discussion, the city council held the
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ordinance at its second reading until the next City Council meeting. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014).

Third and Final Reading
In the third and final reading of the ordinance held on August 19th, the expected turnout from
citizens was so high that there was discussion of moving the meeting to a larger location than the planned
venue of City Hall. While the venue change was not approved, the attendance of the meeting left the
chambers at full capacity. The original meeting earlier in the month had had 22 public responses, the
August 19 meeting held in City Hall had 73 statements during its time for public comment. Of these
residents, 49 were in favor of the ordinance and 24 were opposed. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014).
A number of opponents’ arguments were similar to those heard in the first meeting, such as
allowing predators to enter public bathrooms. Additional arguments were presented that the ordinance
could hurt local business by causing companies to start businesses outside of the city. Many respondents
asked a similar question – where is the discrimination? To this question, a number of people spoke up on
discrimination instances experienced personally or witnessed. One respondent claimed to have lost
employment due to his sexual orientation; another resident spoke of fears that a landlord would evict him
if they learned he was gay. While many agreed that Fayetteville is a “fair-minded place,” there are
“isolated instances of oppression” that warrant city action.
In addition to public comment, several amendments were proposed before the final vote of the
City Council. All tax-exempt institutions and places of worship owned by a religious institution were
voted by aldermen to be exempt from the ordinance. Alderman Justin Tennant proposed an amendment to
allow the citizens to decide the fate of the legislation in a public vote during the upcoming general
election. With opposing opinions regarding this amendment, the council voted 2-6 to reject Alderman
Tennant’s amendment. However, the public would still have the chance to challenge the new law by
issuing a petition to halt the effective date of the ordinance and institute a special election.
After ten hours of discussion and the longest meeting in city council history, the aldermen voted
in a 6-2 vote for the passage of the ordinance. Understanding that there were key disagreements amongst
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respondents, the law was passed with the anticipation it may need to be amended in order to serve all
citizens. Council members against the ordinance claimed that it was “irresponsible” to enact an ordinance
that was not complete. However, those who voted for the ordinance agreed that discrimination was an
issue to be dealt with urgency, and that it was city council’s responsibility to “take the first step.”
(Fayetteville Flyer, 2014).

Public Sponsors and Advocacy Groups
Proponents of the legislation registered an Arkansas Ballot Question Committee with the
Arkansas Ethics Committee called Keep Fayetteville Fair. The group was established to defend the Civil
Rights Administration Ordinance and to campaign for voters’ ballot in the election. The group advocated
that their supporters are individuals who “believe all folks who work hard, pay their taxes, serve in our
military, and contribute to our community deserve to be treated fairly under law, including our gay and
transgender neighbors.” (Keep Fayetteville Fair, 2014). The advocacy group was funded on donations
from supporters, including the Pulaski County Democratic Committee, the NWA Center for Equality, and
the Human Rights Campaign. The Human Rights Campaign donated money and nonmonetary
contributions totaling $166,080.50 from the organization’s Washington D.C. headquarters. (Henry, 2014).
Opponent activists also registered with the Arkansas Ethics Committee and created a Ballot
Question Committee called Repeal 119. The advocacy group cited that while they are not in favor of
discrimination, they feel that the ordinance “elevates sexual orientation and gender identity” to being a
basic human civil right comparable to race, gender and religion. The group states that the ordinance
actually increases discrimination by giving sexual orientation and gender identity greater protection and
privileges than race, gender and religion. Repeal 119 stated that a vote against the ordinance would:
support the local business community by rejecting excess government regulation; defend citizens’ First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and religion; protect women and children in public places such as
restrooms and locker rooms; and give citizens the right to set their own laws. (Repeal 119, 2014).
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Special Referendum Election
With City Council’s August 19 approval, Ordinance 5703 was set to go into effect on September
20, 2014. As Alderman Tennant was denied his request to amend the ordinance by suspending the
ordinance’s enactment until the public voted in a special election, opponents had until that date to take
significant action. In order for the opponents to receive the public referendum and special election they
sought, they had until the enactment date to turn in a petition with the needed 4,095 signatures, equal to
fifteen percent of the citizens who voted in the most recent mayoral election. Immediately following the
ordinance’s approval, opponent group Repeal 119 began petitioning for the public referendum and
collecting signatures of citizens who were in favor of a public vote. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014).
Collected by the City Clerk’s office, Repeal 119 turned in 5,722 signatures on the first count
September 20. The City Clerk’s office had ten days to verify the validity of each signature and to identify
duplicate signatures. By September 29, the Office certified there were adequate signatures on the petition,
thus suspending the enactment of the ordinance until the public voted in a special election. The election
date was approved for December 9, 2014. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014).

Final Weeks
In the final weeks between the public referendum and the December 9 special election, both
proponents and opponents were making significant measures to educate the public. Local government and
public leaders were also taking action in the debate. On November 6, 2014, the Fayetteville Chamber of
Commerce announced that they were holding a press conference the next day to discuss their Board of
Director’s “unanimously adopted” decision to issue “a resolution calling for the Repeal of Ordinance
5703.” The Chamber’s decision to take a stance on the public debate was made for a number of reasons,
primarily that the ordinance criminalized civil conduct and was vague and incomplete.
In the announcement of the Chamber’s press conference, the Chamber expressed it was “never
good public policy for any governmental entity to adopt rules, regulations, ordinances or laws that are
vague, incomplete, fail to include critical definitions for prohibited acts or conduct that may be later be
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adjusted as criminal.” In the press conference the following day, the Chamber’s Board of Director’
Chairman, Bill Bradley stated that the purpose was to “announce the plans of an informational campaign
to recommend to their members and the public to repeal Ordinance 5703.” Bradley claimed that the
“exclusive focus of [the Board’s] informational campaign is that the law is seriously flawed as written.”
The Chamber urged voters to vote in favor of the Ordinance’s repeal on December 9. (City of
Fayetteville’s Chamber of Commerce, 2014).
Several actions and statements were made in response to the Chamber of Commerce’s resolution.
Proponent advocacy group Keep Fayetteville Fair issued a statement the day of the conference expressing
disappointment in the Chamber’s decision to take a stance on such a divisive issue. City Council
Alderman Mark Kinion, supporter of the ordinance, stated that he planned to return the $250 endorsement
he received from the Chamber of Commerce for his reelection fund. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2014). On
November 10, University of Arkansas Chancellor G. David Gearhart issued a letter asking the president
and chairman of the Chamber of Commerce to “rescind” its action. Writing as an “ex-officio member of
the Board of Directors” he stated that he was not asked his opinion regarding the Chamber’s resolution.
The Chancellor wrote that the Chamber “should promote harmony and prosperity, not create crisis” and
that the issue has “strained relations among town, gown and individual citizens.” The same day, Mayor
Lioneld Jordan also issued a letter requesting the Chamber to rescind its decision to “oppose and lobby”
against Ordinance 5703. Jordan also stated that he too, as an ex-officio member of the Board, was not
aware nor given any notice of the Chamber’s meeting and decision. To see Chancellor Gearhart and
Mayor Jordan’s statements to the Chamber of Commerce, see Appendix B.

Voting Results
Voters cast their ballots on the special election on December 9, 2014 with a turnout of 29.42% of
registered Fayetteville voters. The Civil Rights Administration Ordinance was repealed by a vote of
51.65% to 48.35%, a nominal difference of 480 votes. (Washington County, 2014). With such a close
margin, many citizens requested a revision of the ordinance to be made. In a statement issued on
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December 12, City Attorney Kit Williams declared his disappointment with the outcome of the election,
stating that he did not truly believe Fayetteville had a discrimination problem until the “marathon”
campaign for Ordinance 5703. Although he did not believe a revision of the original ordinance would be
best for the city, the city needed a noncomplex ordinance to “place Fayetteville on the side of equality,
justice, love and inclusion.” To see the City Attorney’s statement to City Council, see Appendix C.

Impact – Other Municipalities and State Response

Although it was not upheld by the voters, Ordinance 5703 and the proposed Chapter 119
amendment of the City of Fayetteville code had significant impact in the State of Arkansas. The bill was
one of the first of its kind to protect the interests and civil rights of the LGBT community by prohibiting
discrimination for two new classes in civil rights. It also presented a problem that was seldom advocated
for and scarcely understood in the state. Upon the release of the Human Rights Campaign’s report, local
municipalities began to take action by drafting their own versions of nondiscrimination ordinances.
In the months following Fayetteville’s voter repeal of Ordinance 119, cities and counties
throughout the state moved forward with their own civil rights legislation. In February 2015, the city of
Eureka Springs’ city council voted unanimously to enact Ordinance 2223, which prohibits discrimination
based on “real or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender
expression, familial status, marital status, socioeconomic background, religion, sexual orientation,
disability or veteran status.” (Eureka Springs, Arkansas, Municipal Code § 7.65). Eureka Springs, quoted
as the “Gay Capitol of the Ozarks,” was the first to offer domestic-partnerships and the first to conduct
marriages of LGBT couples; however, the city did not have the legal means to protect those individuals
until the ordinance was introduced. Based off of Fayetteville’s original legislation, Ordinance 2223
protects all citizens of the city. After city debate, the ordinance was voted on and passed by the citizens
on May 12, 2015. (Northwest Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 2015).
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The state capitol of Little Rock introduced an anti-discrimination ordinance at the proposal of
City Director, Kathy Webb, and was voted on by the Little Rock City Board on April 21, 2015. The
ordinance is similar to other municipalities’ in that it prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity; however, its focus centers around workplace and employee discrimination. The
ordinance was passed in a 7-2 vote. (Arkansas Times, 2015). A little over a month later, Pulaski County
took a stance on the issue when it passed its own anti-discrimination ordinance in a vote 10-5 by members
of its Quorum Court on May 26, 2015. Pulaski County, the largest county in Arkansas and home to the
city capitol of Little Rock, was the sixth municipality to enact nondiscrimination legislation for its
citizens. (Human Rights Campaign, 2015).
However, while local municipalities were making great strides towards inclusion and equality of
the LGBT community, the state legislature was making great strides to prevent it. In early 2015, Senator
Ben Hester (R-Cave Springs) sponsored and filed Senate Bill 202, The Intrastate Commerce Improvement
Act with the state senate. The purpose of the bill was to create antidiscrimination legislation that is
“uniform” throughout all levels of government within the state. To achieve this, the bill prohibits any city,
county, or other political municipality to “adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule or policy that
creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.” On
February 24, the bill was passed by the Arkansas General Assembly and created Act 137 of the Arkansas
Code. (Arkansas 90th General Assembly, 2016). While intended to be a roadblock for further LGBT
nondiscrimination ordinances, the language of the act has created a state wide debate over the intended
interpretation. Until clearly interpreted by the highest level of court, municipalities continued to adopt
ordinances in line with both the law and the needs of their citizens.
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PART TWO: THE UNIFORM CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTION ORDINANCE
Introduction – The Need for A Fayetteville Civil Rights Protection Ordinance

Following the public’s veto and repeal of Ordinance 5703, proposals were made for a revised
version within days. On December 12, 2014, just three days after the special election of the original civil
rights ordinance, Fayetteville City Attorney Kit Williams issued a statement and memo to City Council
addressing the city’s next steps. In his memo, titled “The Need For A Fayetteville Civil Rights Protection
Ordinance,” Williams claimed that he felt that a revision of the original ordinance was “ill-advised” and
“would not likely end the divisiveness and bring consensus.” However, the reality of discrimination in
Fayetteville had been exposed and the city attorney felt that he had a duty to the citizens who elected him
to “unite Fayetteville in freedom and fairness.” The forthcomings from the previous legislative process
had made it clear that there was still a need to protect all citizens of Fayetteville, but on its own terms.
Therefore, Kit Williams drafted an entirely new anti-discrimination ordinance to better serve the citizens
of Fayetteville and provide protection to all. To see the City Attorney’s statement to City Council, see
Appendix C.
In his address to the Fayetteville City Council, Williams stated that he intended to create
legislation largely accepted by a majority of voters rather than a small minority. Thus, the proposed
ordinance would be “laser focused” on the true problems that needed to be addressed. In developing such
important and controversial legislation, Williams stated that it would be a mistake to rely upon an
ordinance drafted by a Washington D.C.-based special interest group, the Human Rights Campaign. For
such a sensitive and debated topic, there must be an understanding of the state and city’s history, law and
composition, as well as the utmost concern for all of Fayetteville’s citizens.
In doing so, the City Attorney derived a significant portion of the context from the Arkansas Civil
Rights Act of 1993 (ARCA), which after two decades of application and history, is looked to for guidance
throughout the state when issues of discrimination must be confronted. Specifically, Williams included
exact definitions of “Employee”, “Employer”, “Religion”, and “Place of public resort, accommodation,
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assemblage, or amusement” from the A.C.R.A. He also narrowed the scope of the proposed ordinance by
integrating the §16-123-103 Applicability, § 16-123-107 Discrimination Offenses, and § 16-123-108
Retaliation statutes from the Arkansas Code. The ACRA provides discrimination protections on the basis
of “race, ethnicity, national origin, age, sex, religion and disability.” Because there are no protections
from discrimination towards gender identity and sexual orientation in the ACRA, Williams referenced
applicable and relevant laws throughout the courts in which transgender individuals have been granted
protection, such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
While it was noted that a completely new ordinance would not automatically bring a consensus
amongst differing viewpoints, a “shorter, more focused, and clearer” ordinance would give citizens a
better understanding of where they stood. Instead of broad definitions, offenses, and applications to
interpret, citizens would be able to reference a carefully constructed ordinance, tailored specifically for
Fayetteville’s actual problem. In order to have a better understanding of what that problem is, what form
it takes, and the best measures for fixing the it, sponsors and proponents of the new ordinance went
straight to the source: Fayetteville citizens. Public opinions of residents, businesses, religious leaders of
Fayetteville were used to draft an ordinance that took all stances into account.

The Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance

After months of provisions and drafts, Ordinance 5871 was ready to be presented to the public.
The final draft, entitled The Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance, declared the ordinance as an
“intent to ensure uniform nondiscrimination protections within the City of Fayetteville for groups already
protected to varying degrees throughout state law.” See Appendix. The ordinance references, as City
Attorney Kit Williams noted, federal and state laws already protecting discrimination including the Civil
Rights Act, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, and the Arkansas Domestic Peace Act, that already
protect Fayetteville citizens from discrimination on the basis of cited protected classes of sexual
orientation and gender identity. The ordinance cites that the Arkansas General Assembly has previously
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recognized the need for protection the classifications gender identity and sexual orientation in § 6-18514(b)(1) of the Arkansas Code, Anti-bullying policies. (A.C.A 6-18-514(b)(1). However, the statute in
question directly relates to bullying in schools and pertains to students. The ordinance attests that the
inclusion of these protected classes in prior legislation is substantive justification for the city of
Fayetteville to attempt to prohibit the “isolated but improper circumstances when some person or business
might intentionally discriminate against our gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender citizens.” The
Arkansas Domestic Peace Act prevents shelters from discriminating against sexual preference. To see
Ordinance 5871 and its provisions, see Appendix D.
After conducting interviews with groups and individuals in Fayetteville, city council members
found that most voters supported the original ordinance while a portion felt that it “wasn’t a good fit for
the community.” (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015). Additionally, some residents who were for the original
legislation claimed they were confused by the language used during campaigning and on the ballot. Based
on the responses, city council felt that the issue of gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination is
better left up to the community through a special election. The decision for a special election was made in
order to respect the vote of those who voted in the original ordinance as well as to provide “clear and
transparent” ballot language. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015). The ordinance states that enactment or rejection
of the ordinance was to be decided by the majority of voters on the date of September 8, 2015.

Provisions of the Bill
As stated in Fayetteville City Attorney Kit William’s statement regarding the need for a city civil
rights ordinance, parts of the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance were adopted and incorporated
from the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. In the section entitled “Discrimination Offenses,” the
ordinance states that the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity “is the same right of every citizen to be free from discrimination because of race, religion,
national origin, gender and disability as recognized and protected by the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of
1993. These rights include: the right to obtain and hold employment; the right to the full enjoyment of the
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accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage, or amusement; the right to engage in property transactions; the right to engage in credit and
other contractual agreements; and the right to vote and participate fully in the political process.” See
Appendix. Additionally, the ordinance also states that those participating in real estate transactions must
engage in conduct on the basis mandated in the Arkansas Fair Housing Act.
Upon its enactment, the ordinance establishes a Civil Rights Commission to review
discrimination complaints made with the city. The commission’s duties consist of the review, discussion,
and decision of submitted complaints claimed to be in violation of the Uniform Civil Rights Protection
Ordinance. The seven-member Commission, appointed by City Council, shall be composed of: two
members and representatives of the business community; two owners or property managers of rental
property; one citizen with employment or human resource law experience; and two “citizens at large,”
with at least one who identifies as a member of the LGBT community. The Civil Rights Commission will
have annual meetings with City Council to discuss the complaints received along with their outcomes.
The city attorney’s office will support the Civil Rights Commission by receiving complaints on the
group’s behalf and assisting in responsibilities.
Discrimination complaint and enforcement procedures are specifically detailed in the ordinance
for situations in which an alleged case of discrimination is reported. Upon experiencing or learning of
discrimination in violation of the ordinance, an individual, referenced as the “complainant,” has ninety
days from receiving the facts of the incident to report it with the city attorney’s office. Once received, the
office has two business days to notify the Civil Rights Commission of the complaint. Before any
enforcement procedures begin, the city shall make mediation or conciliation efforts between the accused
discriminator, referenced as the “respondent,” and the complainant. The resolution measures, which
should begin within four days upon receiving the complaint and last no longer than two weeks, are subject
to the Confidentiality of communications in dispute resolutions section of the Arkansas Code. (A.C.A 167-206).
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If the city’s efforts are successful and the discrimination dispute is resolved, the Civil Rights
Commission will not proceed with enforcement procedures. However, if the mediation and conciliation
efforts do not resolve the dispute, the Commission must determine if the ordinance was violated. After the
failed mediation efforts conclude, the Commission will notify parties of a hearing scheduled between five
and fourteen days after the conclusion. At the hearing, the Commission will review the initial complaint
and accept any additional evidence from the complainant. Next, the respondent will defend, explain, or
“rebut any allegations of illegal discriminatory acts” as well as provide any favorable evidence. Once the
Commission has heard both party’s argument, a determination must be made if the respondent’s actions
were in violation of the ordinance; if so, the complaint and the Commission’s findings are forwarded to
the city prosecutor. No violation of the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance is a misdemeanor or
felony. An individual’s first violation will result in a penalty of a $100.00 fine. For additional
discriminatory violations, individuals will be subject to a maximum penalty of $500.00, following the
Fayetteville City Codes’ §10.99 General Penalty.

Differences from Ordinance 5703
While opponents of the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance declared that it was simply a
reintroduction of the original, there are many differences between the two bills. First and foremost, the
original Ordinance 5703 was very vague in terms of discriminatory offenses, entities subject to the
ordinance, and enforcement procedures. While Ordinance 5703 and Chapter 119 included vague
definitions for protected classes such as “socio-economic status” and “physical characteristics,” the
Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance clearly emphasizes and defines its intended classes of “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity.” The original nondiscrimination ordinance also did not clearly explain
the types of acts that would be determined discriminatory or their associated penalties, whereas Ordinance
5871 adopted the section “Discriminatory offenses” directly from the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993
as well as offenses in real estate transactions from the Arkansas Fair Housing Act. Additionally, as
Chapter 119 did not reference penalties, many citizens feared it would be considered criminalized civil
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conduct and would strip them of their business licenses. Ordinance 5781 adopted the General Penalty
statute from the Fayetteville City Code, limiting the maximum fine to $500.00.
Chapter 119’s poorly defined complaint procedures and enforcement policies were large
contributors of the public’s confusion. The ordinance had no clear set of complaint procedures and placed
a large amount of responsibility and authority in the hands of the Civil Rights Administrator. In contrast,
the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was carefully thought out and developed to ensure that the
information was easily accessible to the city. The creation of a Civil Rights Commission, a detailed and
confidential mediation process, and a specific complaint procedure allowed the city to address concerns
while still creating effective legislation.
TIMELINE

City Council Approval
After months of drafts, discussions and interviews, the Uniform Civil Rights Protection
Ordinance was ready for its City Council vote. A co-sponsor of the ordinance, City Council member
Adella Gray introduced it on June 3, 2015 in an agenda-setting City Council session. The agenda request
was approved and the ordinance was set to have its first reading on the June 16, 2015 city council
meeting. Anticipating another large turn out from the public, Mayor Lioneld Jordan established a code of
conduct for the meeting, limiting public comment to three minutes per individual.
The meeting began with fourteen proposed amendments to be made to the ordinance by
Alderman John La Tour, an active opponent of the city’s original legislation. The amendments were not
supported, allowing public discussion to follow with the floor open to Fayetteville residents and visitors.
Over fifty individuals spoke, sharing stances, opinions and experiences with the council. Following the
public statements, the city council members were able to discuss the ordinance and their opinions.
Alderman La Tour reiterated prior arguments and voiced that he felt City Council’s responsibilities
should be limited to basic problems, not civil rights.
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However, other Aldermen disagreed. The next in line to speak, Alderwoman Sarah Marsh
“motioned to suspend the rules and take the ordinance to the second reading” which was voted 7-1 by
council members. Immediately following, Alderman Kinion, also motioned to suspend the rules and to
take the ordinance to its third and final reading as the ordinance had gone through substantial discussion
throughout its production. The motion had a vote of 5-3 from members, thus requiring Mayor Jordan to
cast a vote to get to the required six affirmative votes. In its final reading, council members discussed the
special election and other specifics until the time came for the final vote. The Uniform Civil Rights
Protection Ordinance was passed by city council in a 6-2 vote, with only Aldermen La Tour and
Schoppmeyer casting negative votes. Per the ordinance, the legislation would not be enacted unless
approved by voters in the September 8 special election. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015).

Public Opinion
With less than three months between City Council’s approval of Ordinance 5871 on June 16 and
the scheduled special election on September 8th, parties on both sides of the legislation began
campaigning. Many of the stances and opinions were reiterations from the prior ordinance’s campaign.
However, the more clearly defined ordinance allowed many individuals to take a stance when they were
once divided or confused.
For Fayetteville was created as an advocacy group in favor of the Uniform Civil Rights
Protection Ordinance. By July 23, 2015, the advocacy group had the signatures of 305 local businesses
pledging their support for Ordinance 5781. The pledge read: “[Business Name] is an Equality Business.
We do not discriminate on the basis of sexual or gender identity. We embrace diversity and inclusion. We
respect all of our customers and employees no matter their identity or beliefs because this is our
community. We are for Fayetteville. We support the passage of the Uniform Civil Rights Protection
Ordinance on September 8, 2015." (NWA Homepage, 2015). Businesses who made the pledge were
encouraged to display a “For Fayetteville” sticker on their windows while signed pledge cards were
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displayed in the For Fayetteville campaign office. By August 11, the group had received 400 signatures.
(Fayetteville Flyer, 2015).
Formerly known as “Repeal 119,” the opponent advocacy group renamed itself to “Protect
Fayetteville” and began campaigning against Ordinance 5871. The Arkansas Ballot Question Committee,
was largely responsible for the public referendum of Ordinance 5703 in 2014 as Repeal 119, renamed
itself after the city council drafted the new legislation. As before, the group had significant complaints
with the proposed ordinance. Similar to the prior arguments of Repeal 119, Protect Fayetteville had strong
concerns over the affects on local business, freedom of faith, and protection of women and children. The
group stated in a document entitled “What Can Happen Under This Law” that the ordinance “opens the
door wide for the LGBT to accuse businesses and individuals of “civil rights” violations if their wants are
not satisfied. The group also questioned the bills constitutionality in regards to the recently passed Act
137, stating that the city council is “usurping the authority of the people and the State of Arkansas.”
(Protect Fayetteville, 2015)
The group made great efforts to campaign for the public veto of the ordinance by stating potential
outcomes from the ordinance, and even held a rally which featured Oregon bakery owners Aaron and
Melissa Klein as guest speakers. (KGW News, 2015). The Kleins made headlines in 2013 when they
refused to bake a cake for a lesbian couple’s nuptials, claiming that they do not provide for same-sex
marriages for religious purposes. As they were not a registered religious institution, the Kleins were found
guilty of discrimination by violating civil rights. (Reuters, 2015)
On August 22, 2015, the Fayetteville Chamber of Commerce issued a statement endorsing and
supporting the passage of Ordinance 5871. The Chamber stated that it believed Ordinance 5781 had
corrected the problems that they previously found with Ordinance 5703 and urged voters to vote “yes” on
September 8th. They stated that they believed the ordinance was “good for business and economic
development” and “reflects Fayetteville as a welcoming, diverse community.” (City of Fayetteville
Chamber of Commerce, 2015).
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Election Results

On August 1, 2015, the day before early voting for Ordinance 5871 was to begin, opponent group
Protect Fayetteville took its grievances to court by filing a lawsuit challenging the legislation’s legality.
The lawsuit, filed against the City of Fayetteville, Washington County, Mayor Jordan, the City Council
Aldermen, and members of the Washington County Election Commission, requested the court to issue a
permanent injunction that would stop the special election and remove the ordinance from the September 8
ballot. Upon filing for the injunction, the court scheduled a hearing for September 4. (Fayetteville Flyer,
2015).
On September 3, Washington County Circuit Court judge Doug Martin issued an order denying
Protect Fayetteville’s motions and canceling the scheduled hearing. Judge Martin interpreted the
plaintiff’s motions as petitions for writs of mandamus, which are defined in § 16-115-101 of the Arkansas
Code as “an order of the circuit court granted upon the petition of an aggrieved party or state when the
public interest is affected, commanding executive, judicial, or ministerial officer to perform an act or omit
to do an act.” (A.C.A §16-115-101). The judge further interprets that, based on the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruling in Oliver v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 1103, that any “petition for declaratory relief and motion for
writ of mandamus filed one day before an election was moot.” See Appendix. Defined by Black’s Law
Dictionary as a “term that means an open question...debatable...unsettled or subject to argument,” the
court ruled that there was not enough time to have such discussions prior to the election. (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 2016). Judge Martin denied the plaintiff’s motions as they “failed to pursue their petitions
expeditiously” and offered “no compelling reason for their delay in filing.” See Appendix. With the
lawsuit hearing canceled, early voting was to continue until the special election. On September 8, the
Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was passed by Fayetteville voters. Of the 14,593 ballots cast,
7666 (52.77%) voted in favor of enacting the ordinance while 6,860 (47.23%) were against it. The
ordinance was to go into effect on November 6. (Washington County, 2015).
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Following the ordinance’s passage, the city accepted applications for members of the Civil Rights
Commission. Applications were due to the City Clerk’s office by Friday, October 16, 2015 and only valid
for registered Fayetteville voters. After interviewing fifteen applicants, City Council’s Nominating
Committee chose seven potential members for the Commission. In a City Council meeting held on
November 5, the Commission’s nominees were approved in a 6-1 vote amongst the seven present council
members, as Alderman Martin Schoppmeyer was absent from the meeting. Alderman John La Tour was
the only member to cast a negative vote. The appointed members of the Civil Rights Commission
consisted of: business community representatives Candy Clark and D’Andre Jones; rental property
transaction representatives Teresa Turk and Rebekah Champagne; a citizen with civil rights law
experience, Henderson Joseph Brown, IV; and two citizens at large, Benjamin Garner Harrison, IV and
Carol (Chris) Christoffel. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015). As of April 2016, the commission received no
discrimination offense complaints. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015).
While the special election results proved a victory for ordinance supporters and the LGBT
community of Fayetteville, it did not put an end to the city and statewide debate over discrimination. Now
more than ever, the question regarding the legality of Ordinance 5871 and other recently adopted
ordinances is in full force. Although the motion to stop the election of the Uniform Civil Rights
Protection Ordinance was denied due to the timing of the lawsuit, it was not the end of Protect
Fayetteville’s fight to repeal the legislation—their complaints in the case still stood. (Fayetteville Flyer,
2015). With the enactment of Ordinance 5871 scheduled for November 6, opponents kept their stance and
continued to work to prove the legislation’s illegality in court.
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Part Three: Legality in Question

The Lawsuit

Lawsuit Basics and Complaints
The initial civil suit was filed on August 31, 2015 in the Washington County Circuit Court by
attorney Travis Story and Story Law Firm, PLLC on behalf of Protect Fayetteville, formerly known as
Repeal 119. The plaintiffs of case number 15-1510-1 were suing the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas;
Washington County, Arkansas; Lioneld Jordan as Mayor of the City of Fayetteville; Adella Gray, Sarah
Marsh, Mark Kinion, Matthew Petty, Alan Long and Justin Tennant in their aldermen capacities as well
as individually; and Honorees Renee Oelschlaeger, Max Deithchler and Bill Ackerman in their capacities
as commissioners of the Washington County Election Commission. The suit, titled as “Verified
Complaint and Motion for Declaratory Judgment,” was accompanied by six different counts that
contributed to the complaint in which the plaintiffs sought judicial relief for. While some counts of the
complaint were resolved with Judge Doug Martin’s ruling on September 3, 2015, it is important to
understand the entirety of the lawsuit in order to understand where it stands. To see the complete lawsuit
and the corresponding complaints filed on August 31, 2015, see Appendix E.
Count I
The first count was entitled “Passage of Ordinance 5871 violated due process of law.” The
plaintiffs claimed that the Fayetteville citizens’ rights to due process were violated when the ordinance
was passed after all three readings in the same day. Per the Arkansas Code § 14-55-202, “all bylaws and
ordinances of a general or permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three (3) different days
unless (2/3) of the members composing the municipal council shall dispense the rule.” (A.C.A. § 14-55202). As council members voted to suspend the rules during the initial reading of Ordinance 5871, all
three readings were conducted on June 16, 2015. The plaintiffs claim that the citizens were not given the
opportunity to be heard at a “meaningful time and place” before the council voted. The plaintiffs
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requested a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was void as it was “passed in violation of Arkansas
Code Annotated § 14-55-202.” (A.C.A. § 14-55-202). A declaratory judgment is the court’s authoritative
opinion regarding the exact nature of the matter that is before the court.
Counts II, III
Counts II and III of the lawsuit pertain to the plaintiffs request to halt the special election of
Ordinance 5871. Count II of the lawsuit is entitled “Passage of Ordinance 5871 Violates the
Constitutional Rights of the Voters Who Repealed Ordinance 5703 in the Special Election on December
9, 2014.” It states that the act of passing the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance violated
Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution which states, “No measure approved by a vote of the people
shall be amended or repealed by any city counsel, except upon a yea and nay vote on roll call of twothirds of all the members elected to the city council.” The plaintiffs stated that the ordinance is so similar
in nature to the original, voter- repealed ordinance that it violates the citizens’ constitutional rights. Thus,
the plaintiffs requested declaratory judgments that Ordinance 5871 was a violation of Amendment 7 as it
requires a second vote from voters.
The third count, entitled “Use of Taxpayer Funds for a Special Election for Ordinance 5871
Constitutes an Illegal Exaction and Should Be Prohibited.” The plaintiffs claim that Article 16, section 13
of the Arkansas constitution protects Fayetteville taxpayers from the city’s “misuse of public funds to
fund an election in which voters have already spoken.” They claim that “irreparable damage” would be
done to the taxpayers through the misapplication of funds. The plaintiffs then requested a permanent
injunction that would prohibit Fayetteville and Washington County from “expending any additional funds
related to the adoption or enactment of Ordinance 5781.” The requests of Count II and III of the lawsuit
were denied by Judge Martin, but the remaining complaints still stood.
Count IV
Count IV of the lawsuit is where the legality of Ordinance 5781 is in question. The title states that
the ordinance is “Unlawful as it Directly Violates Arkansas Code Annotated Annotated §14-1-103;
Arkansas Code Annotated §14-43-610; and Arkansas Code Annotated §16-123-107.” The lawsuit states
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that while the city of Fayetteville has legislative power, the ordinance violated the Reservation of state
power section of the Arkansas Code, which states “Nothing in this subchapter shall limit the power
reserved to the General Assembly to specifically limit the exercise of any powers, functions, and authority
granted in this subchapter.” (A.C.A. § 14-43-610). This point is a reference to the Arkansas General
Assembly’s passage of the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act earlier in 2015. Following this point,
the plaintiffs cite the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act and the area they believe has been violated
by the enactment of Ordinance 5781, that the ordinance “creates a protected classification or prohibits
discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.” The plaintiffs then cite the protected classes which
are contained in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 – race, religion, national origin, gender and
disability, then further cite the legal meaning of gender as “on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. (A.C.A. § 16-123-102; A.C.A. §16-123-107). As gender identity and sexual
orientation are not protected classes within the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs asked for
declaratory judgment that Ordinance 5871 is unlawful.
Count V
Count V relates to the language used for the title of Ordinance 5871, the Uniform Civil Rights
Protection Ordinance, and thus the language used on the ballot for the special election. The main
argument revolves around the use of the word “uniform,” which the plaintiffs state is misleading and
confusing to voters. They argue that the ordinance is not “uniform” by the adjective’s definition found in
Black’s Law Dictionary, meaning “general and uniform when it operates equally upon all persons who
are brought within the relations and circumstances provided for.” They further state that the ordinance is
not only enacted to help a minority rather than all persons of Fayetteville, but that it is not “uniform” with
Arkansas state law, specifically Act 137 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, amongst others.
The request of the plaintiffs was a permanent injunction to prohibit the Washington County Election
Commission from using the word “uniform” on the special election ballot. Again, this request was denied
by Judge Martin due to the timing that the lawsuit was filed.

28

Count VI
The final count of the lawsuit, “Ordinance 5871 violates 42 United States Code § 1983,” states
that the ordinance denies the citizens of Fayetteville of the protected class of “religion.” Specifically, the
lawsuit states that the ordinance violated Equal Protection by allowing LGBT individuals to “write their
own status in the law while denying that same right to religious individuals and the other protected
classes.”

The Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act and Relevant Interpretations

While the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was being drafted by Fayetteville city
council and lawyers, the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act had already been passed by the state
legislature. As ordinances continued to be adopted and enacted throughout the state in wake of Act 137’s
enactment, legality became a large concern. Not only Fayetteville, but all other ordinances that had
clauses that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity were under scrutiny.
In response to this concern, City Attorney Kit Williams shared Little Rock City Attorney Tom
Carpenter’s City Attorney Opinion justifying the Capitol’s ordinance. To see the official opinion of City
Attorney Tom Carpenter, see Appendix F.
In his statement, issued prior to Little Rock’s ordinance approval on April 19, 2015, Carpenter
gives his opinion to a question regarding if the city’s proposed ordinance will be valid after the July 22,
2015 enactment of Act 137. In response, he states that it will be valid as it does not “create any protected
class, nor does it list any prohibited discrimination not already protected by state law.” He then points to
instances of prohibited discrimination in Arkansas law and references Arkansas Code Annotated § 21-12103 which states that it is illegal for an employer to discriminate based on genetic information. He even
lists protections for sexual orientation and gender identity in the Arkansas code, citing the Anti-bullying
provisions and even mentions that “Arkansas law expressly permits the change of official birth records
for transgender individuals.” He also states that the ordinance is “consistent in interpretation by the
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Arkansas Supreme Court of the Equal Protection clause of the Arkansas Constitution. Finally, he states
that it is also in accordance with federal law and regulation, citing Supreme Court case, Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Little Rock Mayor Mark Stodola stated that lawyers and a law professor
have supported Carpenter’s interpretation.
On September 1, 2015, Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge issued an advisory opinion
regarding her interpretation of Act 137 and the legality of recently adopted local ordinances. The advisory
opinion was issued in response to Representative Bob Ballinger’s request for her opinion if Act 137
“would prevent the adoption or enforcement, in whole or in part,” of such ordinances. In her response,
Rutledge states that she believes Act 137 “renders unenforceable any ordinance that prohibits
discrimination on a basis not already contained in state law.” To enforce this point, she argues against the
anti-bullying statute and its protection of sexual orientation and gender identity by stating that the statute
is not a discrimination law. She includes the definition of bullying as “intentional harassment,
intimidation, humiliation, defamation or threat or incitement of violence.” Second, she argues that the
anti-bullying statute pertains to students, and not citizens of a city. She concludes by reiterating her
opinion that debated ordinances are unenforceable under Act 137 as state law does not prohibit
discrimination of sexual orientation or gender identity. It should be noted that advisory opinions are
nonbinding interpretations to questions posed by a government office or official. To see the Arkansas
Attorney General Leslie Rutledge’s advisory opinion, see Appendix G.

Rulings

The City’s Rebuttal
Even after Protect Fayetteville’s temporary restraining order was denied, the special election was
held, and Ordinance 5781 was approved by voters, the lawsuit and its complaints still stood. Once Protect
Fayetteville began to individually serve the Mayor and members of city council, the City of Fayetteville
issued a Motion to Dismiss the claims presented by the lawsuit on October 2, 2015, followed by a Brief of
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Support a few days later. The city claimed that the city council and mayor had immunity in their
legislative decisions and thus it was “improper” for them to be included in the lawsuit. In response,
Protect Fayetteville’s attorney filed a response to the city’s motion as well as a Motion for Default
Judgment, which was denied.

Motion to Stay
On October 22, Protect Fayetteville filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance from being enacted on November 6. In order for a temporary
restraining order to be granted, the plaintiff must meet the required burden of proof. The plaintiff must be
able to convince the judge that there is a high probability that the complaints would be successful based
on its merits and that there would be “irreparable harm” to the plaintiff without the order. In efforts to
meet both requirements, the plaintiffs issued a brief detailing circumstances in which they can show
success based on merits of their complaints. They also detailed that they can show that “immediate,
irreparable harm will occur on November 7” if the court does not enter a preliminary injunction staying
Ordinance 5781 from being enacted” by the violation of the citizens’ constitutional rights.
The City of Fayetteville quickly responded to Motion to Stay in a reply from City Attorney Kit
Williams. In his brief, Williams stated that most of Protect Fayetteville’s claims “involve undisputed
facts” in which the courts are to decide which claims are warranted and which should be dismissed after
examination. The brief also addresses Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge’s advisory opinion
regarding Act 137 and states that the act “cannot constitutionally be interpreted” to prohibit the enactment
of Ordinance 5871 on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. He then questioned Act 137’s
constitutionality based on its intended interpretation, but concluded that it is an issue for the courts to
decide, referencing U.S. Supreme Court Romer v. Evans, 527 U.S. 620 (1996), a ruling on a Colorado law
which resembles Act 137. Amendment 2 was added to the Colorado Constitution following the passage of
ordinances throughout Colorado municipalities that granted protections based on sexual orientation for
housing, employment, education, public accommodations and transactions. Amendment 2 was a public
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referendum approved by voters to supersede the local ordinances by prohibiting any municipality from
granting homosexuals minority status or protected status or claim of discrimination. After the state
judicial process, the amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court as it was found to violate Title
VII of the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment was found to infringe on and burden the fundamental
rights of the LGBT community, as it was a targeted classification which could not be “directed to an
indefinitable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.” Romer v. Evans, 527 U.S. 620 (1996). A hearing
was scheduled for November 6 in which both sides of the lawsuit presented their cases. Following the
hearing, Judge Doug Martin denied Protect Fayetteville’s temporary restraining order as the two
requirements necessary were not met. He dismissed the motion in a formal written order and the Uniform
Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was enacted on November 7, 2015.
The next steps in the lawsuit were the pending Motion to Dismiss filed by the City of
Fayetteville, and Judge Doug Martin was to hear arguments on December 1, 2015. However, in response
to William’s brief questioning the constitutionality of Act 137, the Arkansas Attorney General intervened
on behalf of the state in the lawsuit, thus delaying the hearing late in November. In a brief filed with the
Washington County Circuit Court, Rutledge defended the Act’s constitutionality stating that it “clearly
prohibits Fayetteville’s protections for gay, bisexual and transgender people from discrimination by
landlords and employers.” In response, City Attorney Kit Williams requested Judge Martin to rule in
favor of the ordinance’s validity by either ruling that it can be legally interpreted or that Act 137 renders
unconstitutional. By making this request, the standing Motion to Dismiss became a Motion for Summary
Judgment. The State and Protect Fayetteville had 21 days to respond to this motion and issued crossmotions regarding Count IV. A hearing was held on January 26 to hear each party’s arguments.

Summary Judgment
On March 1, 2016, Washington County Circuit Judge Doug Martin issued an order granting the
City of Fayetteville’s summary judgment and denying the plaintiffs’ request for a cross-motion. Count I,
the claimed violation of due process during the ordinance’s readings, summary judgment was granted to
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the defendants as Judge Martin stated that the “language is plain and unambiguous.” Judge Martin ruled
that Count II, alleging that Ordinance 5871 violated the rights of citizens who repealed Ordinance 5703,
had no merit. He again granted summary judgment to the defendants. Count III, based on the reasons
explained by the defendants, was also granted a summary judgment to the defendants.
Count IV, the complaint that addresses the overall legality of the Ordinance in relation to Act
137, required the most interpretation by Judge Martin. To do so, he divided the act into two parts. The
first “prong” relates to the interpretation of what “creates a protected classification or prohibits
discrimination” in terms of Arkansas state law. First, the defendants’ position and references to the cases
and statues that they believe already protect sexual orientation and gender identity were stated and
explained. The plaintiffs then cited that “the only protected classifications to be here are those in the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act and that sexual orientation and gender identity are not listed. Judge Martin
noted that the Civil Rights Act was not mentioned in Act 137 and is to be interpreted as it reads, “giving
the language used its plain meaning.” Thus, when interpreted in plain language, Judge Martin found that
Ordinance 5781 was not in violation of Act 137.
The second piece of the judge’s interpretation of Act 137 was the intended meaning of the word
“basis.” The Attorney General claims that intended definition of “basis” refers to “an area of law in which
a prohibition of discrimination is contained,” while the defendants argue it refers to underlying reason of
discrimination, such as an individual’s race, age, religion or sexual orientation and gender identity. Judge
Martin ruled that the interpretation is most likely that of the defendants if the Act were read in plain
language, and after looking into the definition of basis in previous legislation, he was unable to certify the
State’s interpretation. As a whole, the act refers to the “reason why a person is discriminated against, not
the area of law in which such discrimination occurs.” Upon this declaration, Judge Martin granted
summary judgment to the City of Fayetteville and its defendants, and denied the State’s and Protect
Fayetteville’s cross-motions.
Count V and Count VI were also granted summary judgment as well, granting full summary
judgment to the City of Fayetteville, City Council Aldermen, and Mayor Lioneld Jordan. The Uniform
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Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was upheld as lawful in the circuit court. To see Judge Doug Martin’s
Summary Judgment ruling on March 1, 2016, see Appendix H.

34

CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

Although The Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance was upheld through the summary
judgment on March 1, neither the proponents or opponents expected the battle to be over just yet. With
the intervention of the State and the constitutionality of Act 137 in question, interpretation was needed
from the highest level of the Arkansas judiciary system: The Arkansas Supreme Court. Following the
summary judgment, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge stated her plans to appeal Judge Martin’s ruling.
On March 31, 2016, she issued a notice of appeal, specifically of the circuit court’s ruling of Count IV of
the complaint. The notice reasons the need for the appeal because it involves the interpretation of the
Constitution of Arkansas; issues of substantial public interest; and issues of first impression; and because
it raises significant issues requiring clarification or development of the law. As one can see in Romer v.
Evans, the Court does have the power to invalidate state action for situations in which a “facially neutral
law” grants legislative power “in a way that nonneutrally disadvantages a specific group.” (Harvard Law
Review, 2015). The final outcome of the ordinance is yet to be determined, but its impact on society has
been groundbreaking in terms of Arkansas law and public participation. (Fayetteville Flyer, 2015). To see
the Attorney General’s Notice of Appeal, see Appendix I.
States throughout the country are currently experiencing similar debates—but not without a
significant amount of backlash. In Mississippi, the Senate approved a religious freedom act entitled
Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, which states gender is
determined at birth. The law allows churches, religious charities, and private businesses to decline
services to LGBT individuals if it is against their religious beliefs on marriage and gender. Diversity
focused corporations that conduct business in Mississippi are voicing their dissent—Tyson Foods, Toyota
and Nissan all spoke their disapproval over the measure. In North Carolina, House Bill 2, known as the
“Bathroom Bill” was passed on March 23, 2016, an unprecedented measure that revoked municipalities
existing ordinances and created a state-wide stance on LGBT rights. The state is receiving a tremendous
amount of corporate and government objection—PayPal ended a $3.6-million-dollar investment; Google
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Ventures’ chief executive boycotted any new investments in the state until the law’s repeal, and many
states have banned tax-funded travel until the law is repealed. (New York Times, 2016).
With so much controversy throughout the country, the fate of LGBT civil rights is unclear. Some
argue that the time has come for federal reform. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has interpreted that the protected classification of ‘sex’ in Civil Right’s Act of 1964 encompasses sexual
orientation and gender identity, as they both relate to the class of sex. (E.E.O.C., 2015). However, there
have still been propositions for an overall amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to add
sexual orientation and gender identity have been made since the 1990’s. Most recently, house bill
H.R.3195, entitled the Equality Act, H.R.3185, was proposed to the House of Representatives in July of
2015. (United States 114th Congress, 2015). The bill proposes the addition of sexual orientation, sex, and
gender identity as protected classifications to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal laws. The bill
would provide protection in the areas of employment, public education, public accommodations, housing,
jury duty, credit transactions, and federal funding. (Advocate, 2015). It would also clarify the existing
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act to prevent religious discrimination towards LGBT citizens. In
a study conducted by the Williams Research Institute, the federal legislation would provide 9.5 million
LGBT identifying adults protection. (Williams Institute, 2015). The bill was referred to the Subcommittee
on the Constitution and Civil Justice on September 8, 2015 and currently resides on the House floor.
Until this bill and others like it are taken up by the federal government, the issue of LGBT rights
will continue to be a matter for the states. As for Arkansas, only time will tell as the citizens await the
State Supreme Court ruling. However, through this political process, voices have been heard—from small
municipalities to the state legislature. These voices closely mirror civil rights movements throughout
American history—voices that have challenged our nation’s society to become the diverse, inclusive
union it is today. The road towards equality is not over, and the need for uniform reform is now more
apparent than ever.
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EXHIB¡T A
CHAPTER 119: CIVIL RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION
orientation, disability or veteran status'

119.01 Purpose
The purpose of this chapter ¡s to protect and safeguard
the right and opportunity of all persons to be free from

discrimination based on real or perceived race,
ethnicig, national origin, age, gender, gender identity,

gender expression, familial status, marital status,

socioeconomic background, religion, sexual orientation,
disability and veteran status. This chapter's purpose is

(E) ''Employee" means any individual employed by

(F) "Employer" means any person, business or
organization which regularly employs five (5) or
more individuals, not including the employeis
parents, spouse or children. For purposes of this
chapter an employer "regularly" employs five (5)
individuals when the employer employs five (5) or

also to promote the public health and welfare of all
persons who live or work in the City of Fayetteville and

more individuals for each working day

to ensure that all persons within the City have equal
access to employment, housing, and public

Definitions

(A) "Business Establishment" means any entity,
however organized, which furnishes goods,

the age of eighteen (18) who may or may not
reside with that individual.

membership requirements is considered to furnish

(H) "Gendei' means actual or perceived sex'

(l)

qualify.

(B) "Civil Rights Administrator" means the person

to receive, investigate

and conciliate complaints brought under

this

chapter.

(C) "Disability" or "Disabled" means, with respect to an
individual, a physical or mental impairment, a
record of such an ímpairment, or being perceived
or regarded as having such impairment. For
purposes of this chapter, discrimination on the
basis of disability means that no covered entity

as

parent or legal guardian to a child or children below

services or accommodaiions lo the general public.

designated by the Mayor

any

(G) "Familial status" means an individual's status

An otherwise qualifying establishment which has
services to the general public if its membership
requirements consist only of payment of fees or
consist only of requirements under which a
substantial portion of the residents of the city could

in

twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current
or previous calendar year. For purposes of this
chapter an "employer" is also any person or entity
acting oñ behalf of an employer, directly or
indirectly, or any employment agency.

accommodations.

119.02

a

covered employer.

"Gender ldentity" means a person's gender-related

identity, whether or not that identity is or is
perceived to be different from that traditionally
associated with the sex assigned to that individual
at birth.

(J)

"Gender Expression" means a person's genderrelated appearance and behavior whether or not
that gender expression is or is perceived to be
different from that traditionally associated with the
person's assigned sex at birth.

(K) "Marital status" means an individual's status

as

single, married, domestically partnered, divorced or

widowed.

shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of that individual's disability.
The term "qualified individual with a disability" shall
mean an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment positions
that the individual holds or desires.

(L) "Place of public accommodation" means inns,
taverns, hotels, motels, restaurants, wholesale
outlets, retail outlets, banks, savings and loan
associations, other flnancial institutions, credit

(D) "Discriminate, Discrimination or Discriminatory'
means any act, policy or practice that has the
effect of subjecting any person to differential
treatment as a result of that person's real or

within the City which offer goods, services,
accommodations and entertainment to the public.

perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, age (if 18

years of age or older), gender, gender identity,

gender expression, familial status, marital status,

socioeconomic background, religion, sexual

information bureaus, insurance companies,
dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, theaters,
recreational parks and facilities, trailer camps,
garages, public halls, and all other establishments

A place of public accommodation does not include

any

institution,

club or other place

accommodation, which by
private.

its nature is

of
distinctly
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or perceived
heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality.

(M) "sexual orientation' means actual

(N) "Veteran status" means an individual's status

as

one who served in the active military, naval or air

service, and who was discharged

or

released

under conditions other than dishonorable.

ll9.03Prohibited Acts of Discrimination

-

Employment

Prohibited Acts of
Discrimination - Housing and Real Estate
Transactions
119.04

With regard to housing and real estate lransactions,
which include both sales and leases, it shall be unlawful
to engage in any of the following acts wholly or partially
for a discriminatory reason:
(A)

With regard to employment, it shall be unlawful for any
employer or labor organization to engage in any of the
following acts wholly or partially for a discriminatory

by

impeding,

delaying,

(B)

To discriminate by imposing different terms on

a

real estate transaction;

(A) To fail to hire, refuse to hire or discharge

an

(C) To represent falsely that an interest in real estate

(B) To discriminate against any individual with respect

to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, including promotion. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require any employer

provide benefits, such

as

insurance, to

individuals not employed by the employer;

(C) To limit, segregate or classify employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
employee of employment opportunities, or which

would otherwise tend to adversely affect his or her
status as an employee;

(D) To include in the terms or conditions of a real
estate transaction any discriminatory clause,
condition or restriction;
(E)

(F) For a property manager to discriminate by refusing
provide equal treatment of, or servíces to,

to

occupants

individual in such a manner that would deprive an
individual of employment opportunities, that would
limit an individual's employment opportunities or

that would

otherwise adversely atfect

(G)

estate transaction

(E) To discriminate against an individual in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to
provide apprenticeship or other job training,

(H)

subsection shall not be construed so as to expose

the person who prints or publishes the notíce or
advertisement, such as a newspaper, to liability;

discriminate in referring an individual for
employment whether the referral is by an
employment agency, labor organlzation or any
other person.

or

proposed real estate

purpose of calling to their attention the existence or
absence of housing accommodations or services
for the physically disabled or elderly;

including on-the-job training programs;

discriminatory notice or
advertisement relating to employment. This

To make, print or publish, or cause to be made,
or published, any discriminatory notice,
statement or advertisement with respect to a real

transaction, or financing relating thereto. This
subsection shall not be construed to prohibit
advertising directed to physically disabled persons
or persons over the age of fifty- five (55) for the

an applicant for employment;

any

she

printed

an

(F) To print or publish, or cause to be printed or

of any real estate which he or

manages;

individual's status as a prospective employee or as

To

To discriminate in performing, or refusing to
perform, any act necessary to determine an
individual's financial ability to engage in a real
estate transactioni

(D) To fail or refuse to refer for employment any

published,

is

not available for transaction;

individual;

(G)

discriminate

discouraging or olherwise limiting or restricting any
transaction in real estate;

reason:

to

To

To

discriminate

in any financial transaction

involving real estate on account of the location of
the real estate, be it residential or non-residential
("red-lining");

(l)

For a real estate operator, a real estate broker, a
real estate salesperson, a financial institution, an
employee of any of these or any other person, for
the purposes of inducing a real estate transaction
from which such person may benefit financially, to
represent that a change has occurred or will or
may occur in the composition with respect to the
race, eihnicity, national origin, age, gender' gender
identity, gender expression, familial status, marital
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lowering of property values, an increase in criminal

(A) Any practice which has a discriminatory effect and
which would otherwise be prohibited by this
chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be
established that the practice is not intentionally
devised to contravene the prohibitions of this
chapter and there exists no less discriminatory

schools in the block, neighborhood or area in whlch
the real property is located ('block-busting");

(B) This chapter shall not apply to any federal' state or

status, socioeconomic background, religion, sexual
orientation, disability or veteran status of the
owners or occupants in the block, neighborhood or

area in which the real property ¡s located or to
represent that this change will or may result in the

means of satisfying a business purpose.

or antisocial behavior or a decline in the quality of

(J) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections

through

(l), it shall not be an

county government office or official, or any public
educational institution within the City.

(A)

unlawful

discriminatory practice for an owner to limlt
occupancy on the basis of a person's low-income,
age over fifty-five (55) years or disability status in

(C) Unless otherwise prohibited by law, nothing
contained in this chapter shall be construed to
prohibit promotional activities such as senior citizen

discounts and other similar practices designed
primarily to encourage participation by a protected

accordance with federal or state law;

(K) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections

through

(l), it shall not be an

group.

(A)

unlawful
discriminatory practice for an owner, lessor or
renter to refuse to rent, lease or sublease a portion

of a single family dwelling unit to a person as a
tenant, roomer or boarder where it is anticipated
that the owner, lessor or renter will be occupying

(D) lt shall not be an unlawful discriminatory practice
for an employer to observe the conditions of a

bona fide seniority system or a bona fide employee

benefit system such as a retirement, pension or

insurance plan which is not a subterfuge or pretext
to evade the purposes ofthis chapter'

any portion of the single-family dwelling or to
refuse to rent, lease or sublease where it is

anticipated that the owner, lessor or renter will be
sharing either a kitchen or a bathroom with the
tenant, roomer or boarder.

(L)

(E) lt shall not be an unlawful discriminatory practice
for any person to carry out an affirmative action

plan as required by state or federal law, or by court

order.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,
it is not an unlawful discriminatory practice to apply
or enforce the definition of "family" for zoning
purposes pursuant to
151 .01 of the Unified
Development Code.

(F)

$

fìde physical requirement. Nothing contained in this
chapter shall be deemed to prohibit a religious or
denominational institution from selecting or
reJecting applicants and employees for non-secular
positions on the basis of the applicant's or

of Discrimination Business Establishments or Public
Accommodat¡ons
119.05 Prohibited Acts

employee's conformance with

(1) That the discrimination is in fact a necessary
result of such a bona fide condition; and

Facilities,

(A) The City of Fayetteville and all of its employees are
bound by the provisions of this chapter to the same
extent as private individuals and businesses.

(B) All contractors doing business with the City of
Fayetteville shall abide by this ordinancé.

119.07 General Exceptions

institution's

proving;

unless required by state or federal law.

Services,
Transactions and Gontracts

the

religious or denominational principles. lf a party
asserts that an otherwise unlavr¡ful practice is
justified as a permissible bona fide occupational
qualification or a permissible bona fide physical
requirement, that party shall have the burden of

It shall be unlawful for a business establishment or
place of public accommodation for a discriminatory
reason to deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of any business
establishment or place of public accommodation,
119.06 City

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed

to prohibit selection or rejection based solely upon
a bona flde occupational qualification or a bona

(2) That there exists

no less discriminatory means

of satisffing the bona fide requirement'

(G)

lf a

party asserts that an otherwise unlawful
practice is justified as a permissible bona fide
religious or denominational preference, that party

of proving that the
discrimination is in fact a necessary result of such
a bona fide condition.
shall have the burden
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under this chaPter,

(H) Any age restrictions required by state or federal

law or regulations, including for the sale or delivery
of alcoholic beverages, are not improper age
díscrimination under this chapter.

(l)

Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to
require any religious or denominational institution
or association to open its tax exempt property or

place of worship to any individual or group for any
ceremony or meeting, except for any act¡v¡ty or
service that is supported in whole or part by public
funds.

(J) Designating a facility as a gender-segregated
space shall not be a violation of this chapter.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
allowing any person to enter any gendersegregated space for any unlalvful purpose'

119.08 Posting of Notices
Every employer or entity subject to this chapter shall
post and keep posted in a conspicuous location where
business or activity is customarily conducted or
negotiated, a not¡ce, the language and form of which
has been prepared by the City of Fayetteville, setting

forth excerpts from or summaries of the pertinent
provisions of this chapter and information pertinent to
the enforcement of rights hereunder. The notice shall
be in both English and Spanish, lf over ten percent of
an employeis employees speak, as their native
language, a language other than English or Spanish'
notices at that employer's place of business shall be
posted in that language. At the request of the employer

or entity, notices required by this section shall be
provided by the City. Notices shall be posted within ten
days after receipt from the CitY.

(C) lt is an unlawful discriminatory practice to.cause or
coerce, or attempt to cause or coerce' directly or
indirectly, any person in order to prevent that
person from complying with the provisions of this
chapter.

l19,lO Preservation of Bus¡ness Records
Where a complaint of discrimination has been filed
against e person under this ordinance, such person
sñall preserve all records relevant to the complaint unt¡l
a final disposition of the complaint.

I Administration and Enforcement
(Ð The Mayor shall designate the Civil Rights
1

19.1

Administrator, who shall administer this chapter
and be responsible for receiving, investigating and
conciliatlng complaints filed under this chapter. To
be considered and administered by the Civil Rights
Administrator, complaints must be received in the
Civil Rights Administrator's office no more than six
months after the alleged discriminatory action or, in
the case of ongoing alleged discriminatory actions,

no more than six months after the most recent

incident of alleged discrimination' The Civil Rights
Administrator shall prepare an easy to use

complaint form

and make the form

easily

accessible to the Public.

(B) The Civil Rights Administrator should first attempt
to eliminate the unlawful practice or practices

through conciliation or mediation. ln conciliating a
compiaint, the administrator should try to achieve a

just resolution and obtain assurances that

the

I I 9.09 Retaliation Prohibited

iespondent will satisfactorily remedy any violation
of the complainant's rights and take action to
ensure the elimination of both present and future

(A) lt is an unlawful discriminatory practice to coerce,
threaten, retaliate against, interfere with or

chapter.

discriminate against a person because that person
has oþposed any practice made unlawful by this
chapter, has made a non-frivolous charge or
complaint, or has testified truthfully, assisted or
participated in an investigation, proceeding or
hearing pursuant to this chaPter.

(B) It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to require,

in compliance with this
lf the Civil Rights Adminishator

unlawful practices

determines that the complainant is not acting in
good faith, the conciliation or mediation may be
tèrmlnated and the complaint may be immediately
dismissed. lf the respondent is not participating in

good faith, the complaint may be immediately
referred to the City Prosecuto/s office.

(C) After any attempted conciliation or mediation, the

request or suggest that a person or entity retaliate
against, interfere with, intimidate or discriminate
against a person because that person has opposed

Civil Rights Administrator will refer any unresolved
complaint and complainant as needed to the City
Prosecuto/s Office for appropriate further action,
including prosecution.

participated in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing authorized

(D)
filing of a complaint under this chapter does
' The preclude
any other state or federal remedies
not

any practice made unlawful by this chapter, has
made a non-frivolous charge or has testified

truthfully, assisted

or

that may be available to a complainant.

UNIVER SI TY O F
Office of the Chancellor
November 10, 2014

Mr. Bill Bradley
Chairman, Fayetteville Chamber of Commerce
123 W. Mountain
P.O. Box 4216
Fayetteville, AR 72702-4216
Mr. Steve Clark
President, Fayetteville Chamber of Commerce
123 W. Mountain
P.O. Box 4216
Fayetteville, AR 72702-4216
Gentlemen:
I would like to respectfully ask that the Chamber of Commerce board of directors rescind its
recent action regarding the civil rights ordinance.
Although I serve as an ex-officio member of the board, I was never invited to offer my opinion on
the decision to issue a statement about the ordinance. Likewise, other ex-officio members were
denied the opportunity to address the issue. However, your media release indicated that the
action was unanimously endorsed by the board members. Such a statement created the
impression that I was in concurrence with your action.
The failure to include all ex-officio members in the discussion contributes to the perception that
the board operated under a veil of secrecy and was opposed to any divergent views. Such a
perception undermines the ability of the board to demonstrate that it consistently functions
within the best traditions of our city which embraces openness and fair play.
Many people favor allowing the citizens of Fayetteville to decide the issue at the ballot box in
December, rather than having pressure exerted by the Chamber. If, indeed, the law is vague and
too broad, the court system of Arkansas will clarify the law in due course.
This has become a flash point issue for our city. The Chamber should promote harmony and
prosperity, not create crisis. This has strained relations among town, gown, and individual
citizens.
Sincerely,

/ 7oa:
/.

Gearhart
Chancellor

425 Administration Building • Fayetteville, AR 72701 • 479-575-4140 • Fax: 479-575-2361 • www.uark.edu
The University of Arkansas is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution.

Dnp¿.nTMENTAL C onnnSPoNDENcE
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KitWilliams
City Attorney

Blake Pennington

TO: Mayor

As sist ant City AttorneY

Patti Mulford

CC: City Council
FROM: Kit Witliams, CitY AttorneY

Paralegal

O(

DATE: Decemberl2,z0l4

RE:

Calls for new Anti-discrimination ordinance

The Need For A Fayetteville Civil Rights
Protection Ordinance

I was surprised that potential revisions of the Chapter 119 Civit

Rights Administration ordiñance were presented so soon aftet the voters
reiealed it in a close, hard fought campaign. I think an attempted rwision
a
of Chapter 1L9 is ill-advise¿ ana presents l-egal conceffrs about whether
version'
super majority of Aldermen would be needed to pass a modified
and
However, the city Attorney's office will continue to assist the Mayor
desire'
any Alderman in ârafting any Ordinance or Resolution that they
On the other hand, I am elected directly by the Fayetteville citizens
voters wefe
and my primary duty must be our citizens first. Fayetteville
and a rehash
ctosety aivided on the civil Rights Administration ordinance
of that ordinance would ,ot likely end the divisiveness and bring
by an
consensus. I believe the city and its citizens will best be served
of citizens,
ordinance that is accepted and endorsed not by a slim majority
Therefore, I will present a brand new antibut by a large
"or,rurrror.
and
discrimination ordinance that would be much shorter, more focused
by the
clearer than the version revised down from the draft provided
draft its own
Human Rights Campaign. I believe that Fayetteville should

anti-discrimination ordinance and incorporate a lot of the definitions and
wording from the Arkansas civil Rights Act of t993. This Civil Rights Act
was deiigned, debated and approved by the Arkansas Senate, the
Arkansas House of Representatives and the Governor in 1993, and its
definitions and provisions have stood the test of time for over 20 years.

feconunendation as City Attomey has always been that
ordinances should be closely directed at whatever actual problem that the
Ciq Council believes needs remedying. An ordinance should be "laser
focused" on the real problem rather than too broadly applicable which is
comparable to firing a shotgun into the cloud of issues which can create
confusion, conflicting laws and unintended consequences.

My

It cannot be disputed that federal laws including the Civil Rights Act
provide many minority or discriminated against groups protection from
much discrimination. The Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 also provides
anti-discrimination protections. Fayetteville citizens are protected against
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicifi national origirç age/ sex/
religiorç and disability. Active duty military and veterans not only have
protectiorU but in some cases preference to honor their service.
Transgender persons have been accorded protection from
discriminatiôn pursuant to Title MI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
or the Equal Protection of the Laws clause.
"

In Price wøterhouse a. Hopkins,

490

TJ

.5. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104

L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989), the supreme court held

that

discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype is sex-based
discrimination. . ..Six members of the Supreme Court agfeed
that such conunents were indicative of gender discrimination
and held that Title MI barred not just discrimination because of
biological sex, but also gender stereotyping--failing to act and
appeaï according to expectations defined by gender. . ..4
pèrson is defineã as transgender precisely because of the
|erception that his or hei behavior transgfesses gender

stereofypes....Accordingly, discrimination

against

a

transgender individual because of her gender'n9l.lqormify
is seidiscrimination. . .." Glenn u. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, \3161317 (ft,r. Cir. 2A11) (some citations omitted; emphasis added);
Accord, schwenk a. Hørtþrd,204 F.3d 1187 (9m Cir. 2000); Rosa rt.
Park West Bønk €¡ Trust Co,, 2!4 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000);
Børnes a. City of Cincinnøti,40'l' F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Seø Leusis
a. Heørtland Inns of America, Sg'!. F.3d L033 (8th Cif. 2009).

lesbian Fayetteville citizens can face
discrimination that ño other citizen would be subjected to without any
legal protections. Accordingly, my draft of an anti-discrimination

Thus,

only gay and

ordinance is focused to protect Fâyettevitle's only unprotected citizens and
does not include any ieference lo discrimination already addressed by
other Civil Rights laws.

The Source For Definitions And Langaage To
Protect Against Discrimination

As

I stated earlier, rather than relying upon a "model ordinance"

from a national group with little knowledge of understanding of Arkansas
law and Fayettäviflå history, I believe we should aPPly the existing
Act of
applicable ¿érinitions and provisions of the Arkansas civil Rights
coúöS for the protection of ó* guy and lesbian friends, neighbors and
workers. m þrace for over 2a jearc, the definitions and provisions of the
and
Arkansas civil Rights Act should now be well knowrç accepted

and
understood and õ-u have already received judicial scrutiny
an
interpretation. Atzl,years of age, the Ar{a1sas civil Rights Act is now
,,adrilt" well-seasoned and tesied law. I believe it is a preferable model
,
gfoup'
than one feceived from a Washington, D.C. special interest

incorporated exactly the definitions of "Employee", "Employer" '
,,Religion" uita "Pløce of pubtic resort, accommodøtion, øssembløge or
a single sentence
ffinuseftrcn{' fromthe Arkansas Civil Rights Act. I added
this shall not
to the last definition of public accofirmoãation: "Furthermore,
facilities and
mean any rerigious raËility incruding churches and similar
including tlt"iti*tted and operated sihools and day care facilities"'

I

I then included the fairly long A.C.A. S 1'6-123-103

Applicability
statute which limits the reach of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and also
limits this proposed Fayetteville Civil Rights Protection ordinance.
Churches are basically exempted from employment regulations and this
statute also provides other protections for businesses.

I took most of the wording from A.C.A. S 1,6-123-107 Discrimination
offenses which would now apply in Fayetteville for discrimination against
a gay or lesbian ciltzen. I also used much of the language in A.C.A. S 16t[S:ng Rehliation to protect persons from retaliation or threats for good
faith reports of discrimination.

ended the ordinance with a requirement for mediation and
conciliation with a refenal for a possible revocation of a person's business
license for a person who will not refrain from continuing illegal
discrimination. No new position of Civil Rights Administrator would be
created. No new committee or commission is created by this ordinance.

I

Like most non development ordinances, its enforcement is statutorily left
to the Mayor. "The mayor of the city shall be its chief executive officer
and...(Ðt rn* be his or her special duty to cause the ordinances and
regulations of the cify to be faithfully and constantly obeyed." A.C.A. S f¿4g-504Powers and duties of mayor generally. The mayor can assign this
task to any employee.

Conclusion
As a heterosexual who does not discriminate against homosexuals, I
assumed there really was not a problem with discrimination against gay or
lesbian people in Fãyetteville before the marathon City Council meeting
opened *yãy"r. Fayetteville is a wonderfully tolerant and accePting City,
but for the rare occasions when the sting of discrimination lashes out
against our gay and lesbian friends, neighbors, and co-workers, we should
hãve a simpie and straightforward ordinance that places Fayetteville on the
justice, love and inclusion. I hope the ordinance attached
side of
"qoitity,
will unite Fayetteville in freedom and fairness.
to this mpmo

4
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ORDINANCE NO. 5781

AN

ORDINANCE TO ENSURE UNIFORM NONDISCRIMINATION

PROTECTIONS V/ITHIN THE CITY OF FAYE1TEVILLE FOR GROUPS
ALREADY PROTECTED TO VARYING DEGREES THROUGHOUT
STATE LAW

\MHEREAS, laws including the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C $ 2000e, et seq.), the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act of 1993 (A.C.A. $ 16-123-101 et seq.) and the Arkansas Fair Housing Act
(A.C.A. 5 16-123-20I et seq.) provide Fayetteville citizens with protections against
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, age, sex, religion and disability;
and

\üHEREAS, the General Assembly has determined that attributes such as 'þender identity"
and'bexual orientation" require protection {A.C.A. $ 6-18-514 (b)(1)}; and
\ryHEREAS, Fayetteville citizens deserve fair, equal and dignified treatment under the law;
and

WHEREAS, Fayetteville seeks to attract a diverse and creative workforce by promoting itself
to prospective businesses and employees as a fair, tolerant and welcoming community; and
WHEREAS, the protected classifications inA.C.A. $ 6-18-514 (b)(l) for persons on the basis
of gender identity and sexual orientation should also be protected by the City of Fayetteville to
prohfuit those isolated but improper circumstances when some person or business might
intentionally discriminate against our gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender citizens; and

WHEREAS, in response to the concerns recently expressed by the citizens of Fayetteville on
a similar issue, the Fayetteville City Council recognizes their interest in participating in the
democratic process and invites the citizens to decide whether gender identity and sexual
orientation should also be protected by the City of Fayetteville.

NOWO THEREFORE' BE IT ORDAINED
CITY OF FÄYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS:

BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE
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1. That the City Council of the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas hereby refers

this
ordinance to the Fayetteville voters for their enactment or rejection in a Special Election to be
held on September 8,2015. The operative provisions that will be enacted by Fayetteville
citizens into the Fayetteville Code if approved by a majority of Fayetteville citizens voting in
the election shall be as follows:

Section

"IJniform Civit Rights Protection
Purpose
Fayetteville is a welcoming, fair and tolerant city which endeavors to ensure that all of its
citizens and visitors will be free from unfair discrimination. Since Federal and State law
already protect citizens from most discrimination, the Uniform Civil Rights Protection
Article shall extend existing protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender citizens and
visitors as recognized elsewhere in state law.
Defïnitions

(A) "Employee". This definition adopts and incorporates herein the definition of
"Employee" as stated in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993,4.C.4. $ 16-123-102(4).
(B)

"Employer". This definition adopts and incorporates herein the definition of
'Employer" as stated in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993,4.C.4. $ 16-123-102 (5).

(C)

"Gender Identity"means an individual's own, bona fide sense of being male or female,
and the related external characteristics and behaviors that are socially defined as either
masculine or feminine. Gender identity may or may not correspond to the sex assigned to the

individual atbirth.

(D)

"Housingaccommodation'l This definition adopts and incorporates hereinthe definition
of 'ÍIousing accommodation" as stated in the Arkansas Fair Housing Act of I993,4.C.4. $

t6-r23-202 (r).

(E)

"Place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement". This definition
adopts and incorporates herein the definition of '?lace of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage or amusement" as stated in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, A.C.A. $ 16I23-I02 (7). Furthermore, this shall not mean any religious facility or other religious institution
including their owned and operated schools and daycare facilities.

(F) "Realestate broker or salesman". This definition adopts and incorporates herein the
definition of "Real estate broker or salesman" as stated in the Arkansas Fair Housing Act of
L993,A.C.A. ç 16-123-202 (2).
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(G)

"Realestate transaction". This definition adopts and incorporates herein the definition
of 'R.eal estate transaction" as stated inthe Arkansas Fair Housing Act of 1993,4.C.4. $ 16123-202 (3).

"Real property". This definition adopts and incorporates herein the definition of
'Real properfy" as stated in the Arkansas Fair Housing Act of 1993, A.C.A. ç 16-123-202

(H)
(4).

(D

"sexual Orientation" means heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by practice,

identity or expression.

Applicabilify and Exemptions

(A)

The Uniform Civil Rights Protection Article is only applicable to discriminatory
actions occurring within the Fayetteville city limits.

This Article adopts and incorporates herein the entirety of AC.A.
Applicabilify of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.

(B)

(C)

$

16-123-103

Churches, religious schools and daycare facilities, and religious organizations
kind shall be exempt from this Article.

of any

Discrimination Offense
The right of an otherwise qualif,red person to be free from discrimination because of
sexual orientation and gender identity is the same right of every citizen to be free from
discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, gender and disability as recognized and
protected by the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993.

(A)

(B)

The Uniform Civil Rights Protection Article adopts and incorporates herein

these

rights as quoted below:

(1)

The right to obtain andhold employment without discrimination;

(2)

The right to the fullenjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or
privileges of any place ofpublic resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(3)

The right to engage in property transactions (including sales and leases) without

discrimination;

(4)

The right to engage in credit and other contractual transactions without discrimination;

and

(5)

The right to vote and participate fully in the political process.
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(C)

A person engaging in a real estate transaction, ot a real estate broker or salesman, shall
not on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity engage in any conduct likewise
prohibited by A.C.A. ç 16-123-204 Prohibited Acts of the Arkansas Fair Housing Act on the
basis of other enumerated attributes.

(D)

No employer shall discriminate against nor threaten any individual because such individual
in good faith has opposed any actor practice made unlawful by this section or because such person
in good faith made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding or hearing related to the Uniform Civil Rights Protection Article.

Establishment and Duties of a Civil Rights Commission
There is hereby established the Civil Rights Commission. The Civil Rights Commission shall
review and decide complaints of alleged discrimination in violation of the Uniform Civil Rights
Protection Article. The Commission will provide to the City Council an annual accounting ofthe
number of complaints received and the outcomes.

Composition

(A)

The Civil Rights Commission shall consist of sevenmembers composed ofthe following:

(1)

Two (2) representatives ofthe business community;

(2)

Two (2) owners or managers ofrental property;

(3)

One (1) representative with experience inHuman Resources or employment law;

(4)

Two (2) citizens at large, at least one of whom identifies as gay,lesbian, bisexual, or

transgender.

Members wilt be appointed by the City Council, each for a term of three years.
Appointments shall be staggered so that each year either two or three members' terms shall be
available for appointment by the Nominating Committee.

(B)

(C)

Members ofthe Civil Rights Commission may be removed from office by the City Council
for cause upon written charges and after apublic hearing-

Meetings

(A)

The Civil Rights Commission shall meet for an organizational meeting within 60 days
after the citizens enact this ordinance and every year thereafter following the appointment of new
members.

(B)

Meetings shall be held at the call of the chairperson.
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(C)

A majority ofthe membership ofthe Civil Rights Commission shall constitute a quorum.

(D)

Allmeetings shallbe opentothepublic.

(E)

The Civil Rights Commission shall adopt rules necessary to the conduct for its affairs,
and in keeping with the provisions of the City's Uniform Civil Rights Protection Article.
Staff Support
The City Attomey's offrce shall receive complaints on behalf of the Civil Rights Commission
and assist the Commission in performing its duties and carrying out its responsibilities.
Complaint Procedure and Enforcement

(A) A person asserting a claim of discrimination, herein referred

to as the 'Complainant",
present
such claim in writing to
must
Article
Protection
Rights
Civil
pursuant to this Uniform
person
has knowledge of the
(90)
after
the
days
ninety
in City Attorney's office no more than
will, within two (2)
office
facts giving rise to the claim of discrimination. The City Attorney's
business days, notify the Civil Rights Commission that a complaint was received.

(B)

Informal mediation or conciliation between the alleged discriminator, herein referred to
as the 'Respondent", and Complainant shall be attempted by the City within four business days
and before any other enforcement measures can begin. Such mediation or conciliation
measgres shall be pursued in accordance with the confidentiality protections provided by
A.C.A. S 16-7-206. Mediation and conciliation should be concluded within two weeks after the
complaint is received unless both parties aglee to fr¡ther efforts.

conciliation efforts are successful in resolving the complaint, the Civil Rights
Commission will be notified of resolution and take no further action.

(C) If

(D) If conciliation

efforts fail to resolve the complaint, the Civil Rights Commission shall
ttoii¡' both parties that a hearing will be conducted at a specified place and time not more than
fourtêen (14) business days after the conclusion of conciliation efforts but not less than five (5)
business days after issuance of notice of the hearing.

(E)
(1)

Conduct of the Hearing:

The Civil Rights Commission shall review the initial complaint and may receive any
additional evidence from the Complainant.
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(2)

The Respondent shall have an opportunity to explain or provide evidence to rebut any
aliegations of illegal discriminatory acts. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself in any formal or informal hearing.

(3)

After considering allthe evidence presented, if the Civil Rights Commission determines
that the Respondent has violated this Article, the Commission shall forward the original claim
and their findings to the City Prosecutor.

(F)

Penalty:

(1)

Aperson's firstviolation of this ordinance shall cany apenalty of up to a$100.00 fine.
Fayetteville City Code $ 10.99 General Penalty shall apply to any subsequent violations.

(2)

No violation of this Article shall be construed to be a misdemeanor or felony.

Severability

If any part, provision or section of this ordinance is held invalid or unconstitutional it shall be
severed from the remainder which shall remain

valid and enforceable."

Section 2. That the City Council for the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas hereby determines that
if the Fayetteville voters fail to approve the referred ordinance, the ordinance will not go into
effect; but if the voters approve the ordinance, the ordinance quoted in Section l will be enacted
into the Fayetteville Code and become effective sixty (60) days after the approving election.

PASSED and APPROVED this 16ft day of June,2015'

ATTEST:

ur, ßail"ro f !'*,Pr

SONDRA E. SMITH, City Clerk Treasurer
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OFFICE OF THE CITY.4.T*TORNEY
5û0 \Nest *larkhom, Ste' 310
Little Rock, Àrkansa* 7?201
1' clcphor:e (501) 37 1 - +52'i
'l'elcfacsin:i1e (501 ) 37.i -4fr75

homas M. Crrpenter
City i\ttomey

Àpril

19 ,2015

I{onorable Joan Adcock
Director-at -[.arge, Position l0
6808 Mablevale Pike
Little Rock, Arkansas 72209

RcI

CITY ATTORNEY OPINION NO.2OT5.OÛI

CITV ANTI.DISCRIMINATION POLICIES \ryILLBE
vALrD lt.FTER AC'r 137 TAKES EFFÐCT tN JULY,2015.

WuuTuen

PROP()SIID ORDINÄNCE oN

Dear Director ¡\dcock:
'l his letter contains the opinion of this

office to l"he question you posed about a proposed antidiscrimination ordinance which w'ill be considered by the l,ittle Rock Board of Directors on
Tuesday, ,April 21, 2015.
Qu

nsrtorv

P

nrsr¡,n'rnn

e proposed

ordinance to codify City anti'discrimination
practices witl be valid aftcr the effective date of ,Àct 137 of 2Û15 on July

Whether
22,20t5,1

SuoRrAtswnR
Ycs. As to intrastate commtlrce, the proposecl ordinancc dsm not create
nny protected class, nor docs it Iist any prohibited discrimination not

already protected by state luw. As to discrimination on activitÍes in
interstatc commerce, Act 137 by its express terms does not âpply.

l

Amendment VII ro the Arkansas Constitution provides fhat no law is effective until 90 days after final
adjournnrent of the General Assembly. The General Assembly is scheduled to adjourn sine die on April ?2,
2015, so the effuctive date of Act l37 rvill be July ?2. ?015.

OFITICE Oiì TI-IE

June 9, 2015
Tentative Agenda
Page 226 of 234
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C¡ty Attornsy Opinion ltio, ?015-$l
April 19,2015: Page 2 of l0

Factual BacrcRounu
April 21,201 5, the Board of Directors will consider a proposed ordinance entitled
"An orrdínance to declare the policy of the City of Little Rock on issues not to be considered in
hiring; to cleclare the policy on companies with which the City contract; to declare an emergency;
On Tuesday,

and, for other purposes." The ordinance has three basic sections:

L

The first section declares that the City will not discriminate against City
vendors "...betause of the race, color, creed, religion, sex, national
origin, age, disability, marital stätus, sexuål orientation, gender identity,
genetic intbrmation, political opinions or affiliation of the vendors'
owners." It also requires that all City departments, divisions, and
commissions, comply with this policy;

Z.

The second section of the ordinance declares that in the delivery of City
services, the City will not discriminatc "because of race, color, creedo
religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, marital status, sexual
o¡:ientation, gender identity, genetic information, political opinions or
affiliation." [t contains a similar requirement for compliauce throughout

all City departments, division, and commíssions; and"

3.

'lhe third section notes that thc City will not contract with any entity that
discriminates "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion" sex, nationaì
origin, age, disability, marital st&tus, sexual orientation, gender identity,
genetic ínformation." The section also notes that City bid documents will
note this requirement, and will also require thåt all contracts with the City
note the vendor's agreemeÌlt to adhere to sush a policy.2

'fhe first two sections apply to the City. The thi¡d section applies only to vendors who wish to do
business with the City and be considered for contracts with the City.
The question of whether the ordinance is contrary to state law arises from the fact that Act 137
ofthe 901fr Regular Session ofthe Arkansas General Assembly states "A...municipality...shall not
adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or

2

The provision applies to all contracts. So, whether a bid is decided on the lowest responsible and
responsive price bid (Rt"P), or on the basis of the most qualified fìrm to dc the work (RFQ). or even in a
sole source bid where it is impractical and unfeasible to bid for a particular good or service, this provision
applies.

June 9, 2015
Tentative Agenda
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Clþ Attorney Opinion No.20l5'lXll
April 19,2lll$: Pnge 3 of t{l

prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law." 2015 ARK. Ac'rs 137 $ 1 (2015).
l'he title of the Act is the "lntrastate Commerce Improvement Act." Id. By its express terms, it
applies only to contracts that in no way involve interstate commerce.s
Drscussroru

I.

Arlcansæ law already lîsts the types of dìsuíminafíon ídentifred in the proposed ordìnance.

The specific question is whether the proposed ordinance, if passed, would et any time violate
Arkansas law as set forth in Act 137 of 201 5 ("the Act'). The Act prohibits two actions: ( t) The
qeation of a protected classification; and, (2) A prohibition against discrimination that is not
otherwise present in "state law." The language reads:
I

4-1

-403. Prohibited conduct.

(a) A county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall
not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rtrle, or policy that creates a
protected olassifieation or prohibils discrimination ün a basis not contained
in state law.

(b) Iåis sectian does not aÍiply to a rule or policy thaÍ pertains only to the
emplayees of a utunty, municipality, or oîher polilical subdivision.
2015

tuk. Acts

137 $

I (ernphasis added).

Nothing in the proposed ordinance creates a protected classification of individuals" The issue
is whether state law already prohibits discrimination fbr the reasons listed in the proposed
ordinance. It does. Because state law already prohibits each kind of discrimination contained in
the proposed ordinance, then the proposed ordinances does not violate the plain words of the Act.
The kinds of discrimination the proposed ordinance wotrld prohibit are:

l.

Race;

2. Color;
r

Because the Act applies onþ to intrastate comm€rse' any interstate commerce aspect of the ordinance
is not under question. Still, as demonstrated in the opinion, provisions of Article tl of the Arkansas
Constitution, as well as various Arkansas stafi¡tes in existence, and the l4th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution clearly establish that the Ciry's ordinance would not violate the provisions of the Act.
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3. Creed;
4. Religion;
5. Sex;

6'

National orìgin;

7. Age;
8. DisabilitY;
9. Marital status;
0. Sexual orientation;
11. Gender ldentitY; and,

1

t

2. Genetic information.a

Race and color are expressly protectcd in the 1874 Arkânsas Constitution:
The equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall ever remaín

inviolate; nor shall any citiz.en ever be deprived ofl any right, privilege oI
inrmulity, nor excmpted lrorn any burden or duty, on account of race, eolor
or previous conditions.
Article II, $ 3, ARK. CoNSr. ln addition to ra.ce, religion, national origin, gender, and disability
are expressly protected in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.
Ttre right of an otherwise qualifred person to be free from discrimination
because of race, religion, natiOnal origin, genders, or the ptesence of any
sensory, mental, or physical disahilìty is recognized as and declared to be a

civil right.
Ark. Code Ann. $ t6-123-107 (a) (I/est 2013). Marital status, as part of the broader term
"familial slåtus" is refurenced in the Alkansas Fair Housing Act.

the

to

obtain housing, and other real estate, without
discrimination becat¡se of religion, race, colar, nalional origin, sø(,
opporrunþ

disability, or familial stafus, as prohibited by this chapter, is recognized and
declared to be a civil right.

a
s

In the quotations from state law that follows this list, the words contained in the list are in italics.

For purposes of ttris provision, "'[b]ecause of gender,' ¡neans, but is not limited to, on account of
or related medical conditions." Ark. Code Ann. $ l6-123-¡02 (l) (West 2013)

pregnancy, childbirth,
(emphasis added).
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Ark. Code Ann. $ l6-123-203 (a) (West 2013). Age discrimination is prohibited in the state Age
Discrimination Act.
It shall be unlau'{ill t'or a public employer

t<l:

Fail or refuse to hire or to clischarge riny individu¿l or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his her or compensation,
terms, conditiõns, or piiuil*ges of employment because of the individual's

(l)

a8e;

(2) Limit, segregate, or classifu employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of ernployment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affbct his or her status as an employee because of the
individual's age....i
Ark. Code Ann. g 2t-2-203 (a) (l) (2) (West 200S). Discrimination by public agencies based upon
a personns creed is expressly prohibited by state law:
Every state agency shall include in its personnel masual a sktemenl that
discrimination by any offrcer or employee based úpon rdce, creed, religion,
national origin age, süc, or gender shall constitute grounds for dismissal.

(a)

A¡k. Code Ann. (i 2l-12-103 (West 200S). An employer's discrirnination against a potential
employee because of genetic information is prohibited. In fact, it is illegal under state law to even
seek genetic information from a potential employee:

(a) An employer shall not seek to obtain or use a genetic test or genetic
informarion of the employee or the prospective employee for the purposes of
tlistinguishing between or discriminating egainst or restrictìng any right or
benefit otherwise due or available to an employee or prospective employee.
(b) An employer shall not require a genetic test of or require genetic
informatior¡ from the employee or prospective employee lor the purpose of
distinguishing between or dismiminating against or restuicting any right or
benefit otherwise availabte to an ernployee or prospective empltyee.

Ark. Code Ann. $11-5-403 (West 2014). StatE law already has specific provisiorls to prohibit
discrimination based r.rpon gender identity and sexual orientatiorr-
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(b)

.uAttribute" means är actual or perceived personal characteristic
including without limitation rûce, color, religion, ancestry, nstíonal origín,

(l)

socioeconomio status, academic status, disability, gender,
physicalappearance,healthcondition,orsexualotienlalion.

gender identity,

..Bullying'o means tlre intentional harassment, intimidation, humiliation,
against
ridicule, defamatioru or threat or incitement of violence by a student
electtnnic, or
another student or public school ernployee by a written, vetbal,
physical act that nray address an attribute ofthe other student, public school
employee, or person with whom the other student orpublic school employee
is associated and that causçs or creates actual or reasonably foreseeable:

(2)

(A)physical harm to a public school employee or student or damages to
the public school employee's or student's property; or " '

(C)A hostile educational environrnent for one (1) or more studeûts or
public school employees due to the severity, persistence, or
Pervasiveness of the act....
status, state
Ark. code Ann. $ 6-lg-514 (V/est Supp. 2015). As to sexual orientation, and marital
law again has a statute in place to prohibit such discrimination:

Every shelter *nurrr 1t¡ Develop and implement a written nondiscrimination
policy to provide services without regard la race, religion, color, age, marital
stalus, natianal origin,ancestry. or sexual preþrence;

tuk.

Code Ann. $ 9-4-106 (1) (West 2009).

In addition, Arkansas law expressly pennits the change of offrcial bi*h records f'or transgender

individuals:

(d) Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in this smte has been
changed by suryical procedure an<l that the individual's name has been
changed, the certificate of bilth of the individual shall be amended
accordingly.

OFIìJCE
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Ark. Code Ann.$ 20-18-307(d) (Wesr Supp.2Û15). While this statute does not mention
discrimination, it is clear that Arkansa.s does not limit sexual identity to that found at birth.6

In short, the proposed ordinance, which on.ly lists types of discrimination that are already
prohibited for one reason or another by state law,? does not violate the Act. Since the state statutory
or constitutional provisions quoted above are already in place, the argument that anything in the
proposed ordinance violates state law, and theref,ore violates the Act, is easily dispatched. After
all, "[tlo give the same words a different meaning fot each category would be to invent a statutç
rather than i¡terpret one'" Burwell t'- Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc', 134 S'Ct' 2751, 2769 (ãA1"4),
quoting with approval, Clark v. Marlinez, 543 U,S. 371,378 (2005). The City does not create any
newform of discrimination in the proposed ordinance.

2.

The proposed ordinonce complÍes with the

Arkansas Constiîtttion Equal Ptotectínn Clause.

As already shown, the proposed ordinance does not list any type of discrimination that is not
already a part of Arkansas law. A secondary question is whether the ordinance somehow violates
the Equal Protection provision of the Arkansas Constitution. The general provision, more fully
cited above, is that "[t]he equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall ever remain
inviolate...." Article II, $ 3, An¡<. CoNsr. In terms of a local govÊHìmental interest to prohibit

discrimination, what does this mean?

'[]f

the constitutìonal conception of "equâl protection of the laws" means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a
political unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
intercst' . Governmenl cünnot avoid the strielures af equul protection
simply be defetìng ta the w¿s/zes or objections of somefi'action of the body

politic.

6

Accord, Radtkc v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Flelpers Union, 867 F-Supp,2d 1023, 1033 (D' Minn.

20t2),

7

Sections I and 2 of the ordinance ma¡rdate that the Cig not discriminatc on the basis of "political
opinions and at'lìliation." This particular requirement is not passed on to private businesses since it is clear
thæ businesses, including corporations, are entitled to First Amendment rights:

We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history
and logic lead us to this cotrclusion.
Citizens United v. Federal [ilection Oornm'n, 558 U.S. 310^ 340 (2009)'
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Jegley v. picado,34g Ark. 600, 635, 80 S.TV.3d 332,352 (2002) (citations omittedxfirst emphasis
proper to
supplied)(second emphasis added). The general question in Jegley was whether it was
it
criminalize sarne sex consenst¡al behavior. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that was not
paúicularly when the same activities by heterosexual couples were not also crinrinalized.

The key to the equal protection argument is that the Court's statement effectively provides
there is no govemmental interest in using taxpayer revenues to fund entities or persons which wish
to dcny equal protection to some group. The desire to Írssure that the City revenues do not directly
or irrdirectly support the denial of constitutional rights to the listed groups is the thmst of the
proposed ordinance. A legislative body "cannot act, under the cloak of police power or public
morality, arbitrarily to invade personal liberties of the individual citizen." See Jegley,349 Ark. at
638, 80 S.W.3d at 353. Since a government cannot act in such a manner, the fact that the proposed
ordinance merely sråtes that the Cify will not act in such a manner, directly or indirectly, is
certainly consistent with the Arkansas Constitution, i.e. state law.

3.

The proposed ordínance

ís consìstent witÍr federal ìnterptetúíons on certaín issøes.

Of the twelve practices prohibited in the proposed ordinance by entities that wish to contract
with the City, only two - sexual orientation, gender identity - can even be said to raise a question
about prohibiæd cliscrimination. Race, color, creed, religion, and national origin, have been
standard prohibitions since the l3th, 14th, and 15ú Amendnrents to the U.S. Constitution were
ratifred. The Equal Protection provision of the l8?4 Arkansas Constitution, as demonstrated"
contained simi tar protections.E

VII of the Civil Rights
prohibited
through the Age
Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. g 2000e. Age discrimination became
Discrimin¿tion in Employment Act in 1967.29 U.S.C. $ 621, et seqi additional protections were
oflbred in tlre Civil Rights Act of 1991. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. $ 626(e). Disability discrirnination
was prohibited for projects that received federal funds with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and for
stete and local government projects in the Amerioans with Disabilities Act of 1991. 29 U.S'C. $
7Al, et seq; 42 U.S.C. $ 12101, et .çeq. Genetic irilbmration became protected at the federal level
by the Genetic hrformation Non-Discrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. $ 2000tr, et seq.
Sex discrimination became prohibited under federal law through Title

In tcrrns of sex discrimination, this prohibition does not apply mercly to the fàct that a person
is male or female. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly helcl that sexual stereotyping

s

fndeed, Arkansas lvas one of the first formerly Confederate states to rati$ the l3th Amendment after
the close of the Civil War.JAtvtES MCPr¡LìRSoN , Battle Cry of Freedom at 840 (Oxford, 1988).
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waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 u's' 228 (19s9). "such
decision." Lewis vstereotypical attitudes violate Title VII if they lead to an adverse emplo¡ment
circuit has ciæd with
Heartland Inns of ,¡merica, LLC, sgl F.3d I033, 1038 (2010). the Eighth
under Title VII when
approval a federal case from the Sixth Circuit that found sex disuimination
he wished'to
afirefighter, who wished to identify as female, was targeted fortermination because
Ohio' 378 F'3d 566' 568
express a fnore lèminine appearånc€ ," Id., quoting Smíthv. City of Salem,
ogender
non-confbrming behavior and
"based on
1eú Cir. 2004). Adverse employment decisions
1Û39'
appearance' [are] impernrissible under Price lfialerhouse." Lewis,591 F'3d at

is prohibited uuder Titte vil. price

for
At present, the U.S. Departrnent of Labor is seeking comments on proposed rule changes
(July
13672
Order
the Office of Federai Cnmpact Compliance Programs to assure that Executive
prohibits
discrimination on
Zl,Z¡l4j,is propcrly implemented. The Executive Order specifically
involve the
th basis of sexual orientation in federat conFacting, which means for contÎåcts that
earlier this
was
issued
(NPRM)
expenditure of federal funds. The Notice of Proposed Rulanaking
because of the
year. 80 Fed. Reg. 5246-5279 (January 30, 2015). Not only was the NPRM issued
and did not
date
Executive Order, but also because current federal guidelines wcre woefully out of
take account of changes in federal law, or federal court decisions'e

4,

The proposed

ordìnance does not require dction hy any busíness in Arkansas.

The proposed ordinance does not requíre any business, or individual, in Arkansas to take any
personnel
affrrmative act. There is uo requirement that any business within the City adopt any
policy because of this ordinance. Instead, the ordinance states that discrimination for certain
the City, it must
re&sons is not allowed, and that if a company wishes to vie for a contract with
follow the very policies the City follows. [n shoft, the proposed ordinance would defïne ân âspect
o.re$ponsive" bidder in a price bid, and a "qualified" bidder in a services bid, as one that
a

of

adhcred to the City's rcquirements against discrimination, and were

willing to execute

a docurnent

to that effect.

Coxcr,usto¡t
The proposed ordinance does not violate Arknnsas law, specificalþ Act 137 of 2015'
becsuse wery prohibition against discrimin*tion named is already named somewhere in
strte l¡w. Further, the proposed ordinance is consistent wÍth intcrpretation by the Arkrnsas

e

These changes included the amendment to Title Vll of the Civil Rights Ac-t to Prohibit Sex
Discrimination Jn the Basis of Pregnancy; the Lily l.edbetter Ëair Pay Act of 2Û09; the FamÍly Medical
435
Leave Act of 1993; and cases that identi$ sexnal harassmçnt such as City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
523
U'S.
75,
78
Servs',
g76);
Offshore
v.
Sundorvner
Oncale
such
as
(
sex
harassment
and
same
l
702
U.S,
(199S).See 80 Fed. Reg. 5246, 5249 and nn. l8-23.
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Finally' the
Supreme Court of the Equal protection clâus€ of the Arkansas Constitution.
proposed ordinencÈ is also in conformity with federal law and regulations that bar
discrimination.
Respectfully submitted,

-<*ntu-*il{

-'J.fu

Thomas M. CarPenter

City Attomey
TMC:ct
cc. Mayor Stodola and Members of the Board of Directors (via email)
Bruce T. Moore, City Manager (via email)
James E. Jones, Assistant City Manager (via email)
William C. Mann, IIl, Chief Deputy City Atlomey (viaenrail)
Bonnie Engster, Law Office Coordinator

STATE OF ARKANSAS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Opinion No. 2015-088
September 1, 2015
The Honorable Bob Ballinger
State Representative
1757 Madison 7150
Hindsville, Arkansas 72738-9558
Dear Representative Ballinger:
You have asked for my opinion regarding the meaning and application of Act 13 7
of 2015. This Act prohibits "[a] county, municipality, or other political subdivision
of the state" from "adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] an ordinance, resolution, rule, or
policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis
not contained in state law." You ask whether Act 13 7 "would prevent the adoption
or enforcement, in whole or in part" of ordinances similar to those passed in Little
Rock, Fayetteville, Hot Springs, Eureka Springs, and Pulaski County.
RESPONSE

The common thread among the five ordinances you cite is that they all amended
their local laws to prohibit certain employers (and others) from discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. I take your questions as asking,
in light of Act 137of2015, whether such ordinances are enforceable.
Act 137 renders unenforceable any ordinance that prohibits discrimination on a
basis not already contained in state law. Because current state law does not
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, it is
my opinion that Act 13 7 renders the five ordinances unenforceable in this respect.

323 CENTER STREET, SUITE 200 · LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
TELEPHONE (501) 682-2007 · FAX (501) 682-8084
ARKANSASAG.GOV
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DISCUSSION
The Attorney General is not authorized to construe local ordinances . But this
Office can discuss a local ordinance when its meaning is clear on its face and
when state law necessarily requires a reading of the local ordinance in question.
The local ordinances you ask about are, for purposes of this opinion, sufficiently
clear that I can discuss how Act 13 7 would apply.
The common feature of the five recently-enacted ordinances you ask about is that
they all updated their local nondiscrimination laws to prohibit businesses from
contracting with the locality unless the business signs an agreement that it will not
discriminate on the basis of (among other things) sexual orientation or gender
identity. Given this common thread, I take your question to be asking whether this
specific action by the localities conflicts with Act 13 7.
Before directly addressing your questions, I will (a) explain how I believe a court
would interpret Act 13 7; ( b) provide a few representative examples of
nondiscrimination laws in Arkansas; and (c) explain why, notwithstanding the
claims of some cities, Arkansas's anti-bullying statute is not a nondiscrimination
statute.
I.
The Meaning of Act 137
Act 13 7' s critical provision states that "[a] county, municipality, or other political
subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or
policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a
basis not contained in state law." 1 Act 137's interpretation turns primarily on the
meaning of the emphasized clause. Because the ordinances you reference all
prohibit "discrimination" on certain bases, I will focus on that part of the
emphasized clause.

The primary question regarding Act 137 is what the General Assembly intended
by the phrase "prohibits discrimination on a basis not already contained in state
law." (Emphasis added.) Act 13 7 states that a "political subdivision of the state
shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance ... [that] prohibits discrimination on a basis
not contained in state law."

1
Acts 2015 , No. 137, § 1 (to be codified at Ark. Code Ann . § 14-l-403(a)) (emphasis added). The
Act further provides that this prohibition does not apply to policies that pertain only to a political
subdivision's own employees. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-l-403(b).
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This language indicates that the General Assembly intended Act 137 to "hold the
field" with respect to antidiscrimination law. The Act expressly prohibits localities
from regulating in that field. More specifically, the Act effectively prohibits cities
and counties from prohibiting discrimination in a way that varies from state law.
In federal jurisprudence, this kind of preemption is known as "express
preemption." The Arkansas Supreme Court has employed this framework when
assessing whether local laws are preempted by state law. 2 By removing the cities'
and counties' ability to enact antidiscrimination laws at variance with state laws,
Act 137 clearly holds the field and leaves no room for political subdivisions to act.
II.

The Anti-Bullying Statute-Ark. Code Ann.§ 6-18-514

One might accept the foregoing and still argue that the five ordinances you
reference are not preempted by Act 13 7. Indeed, I note that two of the five
ordinances you ask about appear to rely on Arkansas's anti-bullying statute-Ark.
Code Ann. § 6-18-514-as the basis for including sexual orientation and gender
identity in their nondiscrimination ordinances .3 But such an argument is mistaken
for two reasons.
First, the anti-bullying statute is not a nondiscrimination law as contemplated by
Act 13 7. The state's anti-bullying statute states that "every public school student
in this state has the right to receive his or her public education in a public school
educational environment that is reasonably free from substantial intimidation,

2

See
Emerald Development Co. v. McNeil/, 120 S.W.3d 605, 608-09 (Ark. App. 2003);
Kollmeyer v. Greer, 267 Ark. 632, 636-37, 593 S.W.2d 29, 30-32 (1980).
3

Fayetteville's ordinance cites the statute twice: "Whereas, the General Assembly has determined
that attributes such as 'gender identity' and 'sexual orientation' require protection {A.C.A. § 618-5 I 4(b )(I)} .... Whereas, the protected classifications in A.C.A. § 6- l 8-514(b )(I) for persons on
the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation should also be protected by the City of
Fayetteville to prohibit those isolated but improper circumstances when some person or business
might intentionally discriminate against our gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender citizens."
Further, a letter opinion from the Little Rock City Attorney specifically relies on the anti-bullying
statute to support the claim that that city's ordinance is in hannony with Act 137: "State law
already has specific provisions to prohibit discrimination based upon gender identity and sexual
orientation." Opinion Letter of the Office of City Attorney for the City of Little Rock (dated April
19, 2015).
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harassment, or harm or threat of harm by another student. "4 To further that
right, the General Assembly specifically defined what is meant by "bullying":
"Bullying" means the intentional harassment, intimidation,
humiliation, ridicule, defamation, or threat or incitement of
violence by a student against another student or public school
employee by a written, verbal, electronic, or physical act that may
address an attribute of the other student, public school employee, or
person with whom the other student or public school employee is
. d .... ,,5
associate
The statute defines an "attribute" as an "actual or perceived personal characteristic
including without limitation race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
socioeconomic status, academic status, disability, gender, gender identity, physical
appearance, health condition, or sexual orientation." 6
Several observations-from both the text of the anti-bullying statute and an
analysis of the concepts of bullying and discrimination-show that the antibullying statute is not a nondiscrimination law within the meaning of Act 13 7:

1. The statute's text deals entirely with intentional harassment, intimidation,
ridicule, and threats of violence. Unlike the foregoing nondiscrimination
statutes, the anti-bullying statute is not addressing distinctions made
between or among various persons or groups of persons. This is critical
because it shows that one can be equally culpable for bullying one person
as for bullying all persons. But it is logically impossible for one to equally
discriminate against all persons. For if one had a policy that applied equally
to all persons (both expressly and in terms of its impact), then-far from
being discriminatory-such a policy would be neutral.
2. The anti-bullying statute deals with students who bully other students or
public-school employees. The anti-bullying statute is not addressing the
employment context. Far from being a nondiscrimination law, such a
4

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-l 8-514(a) (Repl. 2013) (emphasis added).

5

Ark. Code Ann.§ 6-18-514(b)(2) (emphases added).

6

Ark. Code Ann.§ 6-18-514(b)(l).
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statute is essentially a civil analogue for such cnmes as harassing
communications 7 and terroristic threatening. 8
3. The statute says that the bullying "may address" one of the listed attributes.
Under the statute, one can bully another entirely without reference to the
person's attributes. In contrast, the only way for a person to violate one of
the nondiscrimination statutes noted above is for the person to discriminate
on one of the listed bases.
4. Quite apart from the text of the anti-bullying statute, the definitions of
bullying and discrimination are entirely separate. When "bully" is used as a
verb, it means "I. To threaten, intimidate, embarrass, or pressure (a person)
by force, taunt, or derision. 2. To use abusive language or behavior
against." 9 Neither of these concepts is present in the definition of
discrimination: "1. The intellectual faculty of noting differences and
similarities. 2. The effect of law or established practice that confers
privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality, religion,
or disability ... . 3. Differential treatment; esp. a failure to treat all persons
equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored
and those not favored." 10 These definitions show that bullying is not a
subset of discrimination and that discrimination is not a subset of bullying.
The two concepts are distinct.
But even if one assumed, for purposes of argument, that the anti-bullying statute is
a nondiscrimination law, the law would still not authorize the five ordinances. This
is because, as noted above, Act 13 7 holds the field with respect to
nondiscrimination laws. Thus, if the local ordinances vary at all from state laws
that prohibit nondiscrimination, then the local ordinances are preempted by Act
13 7, which states that the local ordinances cannot be enforced. Local ordinances
that are ostensibly based on the anti-bullying statute cannot vary from it. But, as
noted above, the anti-bullying statute only applies to a public-school student and
only in the public-school context. Therefore, when the local ordinances take the
7

Ark. Code Ann.§ 5-71-209 (Rep!. 2013).

8

Ark. Code Ann.§ 5-13-301(Rep!.2013) .

9

Black's Law Dictionary 236 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 10th ed. West 2014).

10

Id. at 566.
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words "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" entirely out of section 6-18-514 's
context, and try to apply them to an area the General Assembly has not, the
ordinances are varying from state law and, thus, unenforceable to that extent.
Therefore, because no state law currently prohibits discrimination based upon
someone's sexual orientation or gender identity, I can say that Act 137 renders the
local ordinances you ask about unenforceable in this respect.
Sincerely,
.-- - .

-·

Leslie Rutledge
Attorney General
LR:cyh
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PETER TONNESSON; and
PAUL PHANEUF

•

••

PLAINTIFFS

and
THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
VS.

INTERVENOR
NO. CV 2015-1510-1

THE CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE,
Washington County, Arkansas;
LIONELD JORDAN, in his official
capacity as Mayor of Fayetteville;
ADELLA GRAy, SARAH MARSH,
MARK KINION, MATTHEW PETTY,
JUSTIN TENANT, MARTIN W.
SCHOPPMEYER, JR., JOHN LATOUR
and ALAN LONG, in their official capacities
as Aldermen of the Fayetteville City Council

DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' AND STATE'S CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now on this 1st day of March, 2016, comes on for decision the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by separate defendants the City of Fayetteville, Mayor
Jordan and all Fayetteville City Aldermen ("Defendants"), and the Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment as to Count N of the Amended Complaint filed by the
plaintiffs and the State of Arkansas, and having reviewed the pleadings and hearing
1

I

arguments on January 26, 2016, the court finds that the defendants' motion should
be granted in part and denied in part, and the plamtiffs' and State's cross-motions
should be denied.
Standing
Defendants' motion is denied as it pertains to a lack of standing on the part of
Protect Fayetteville based on the reasoning set out by the supreme court in the
of Arkansas Hotels and Entertainment, Inc. v. Martin, 2012 Ark. 335 (2012). Defendants'
motion is denied as it pertains to a lack of standing of the individual plaintiffs
because the individual plaintiffs are citizens, registered voters and taxpayers of
Fayetteville who claim their constitutional rights have been violated and that they
have been damaged by an illegal exaction. See Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600 (2002).
Count 1 of Amended Complaint - "Passage of Ordinance 5781 Violated Due
Process of Law"
Plaintiffs allege that Ordinance 5781 is invalid because Mayor Jordan voted
for a motion to suspend the rules and proceed with a third reading of the proposed
ordinance in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated§ 14-43-501, thus violating due
process of the law.
Arkansas Code Annotated§ 14-43-501(b)(l)(B) states "[the] mayor shall have a
vote ... when his vote is needed[,] to pass any ... motion." This language is plain
and unambiguous and describes precisely the situation complained of: the mayor's
2

vote was needed to pass a motion. Without the mayor's vote, the motion would not
have passed. Arkansas Code Annotated §14-43-501 clearly allows the mayor to cast
such a vote.
Summary judgment is granted as to Count I of the Amended Complaint.
Count II of the Amended Complaint - "Passage of Ordinance 5781 Violates the
Constitutional Rights of the Voters who Repealed Ordinance 5703 in the Special
Election on December 9, 2014."
Plaintiffs allege that the passage of Ordinance 5781 violated the constitutional
rights of the voters who repealed Ordinance 5703 in a special election on December
9, 2014. This claim has no merit and summary judgment is granted as to Count II of
the Amended Complaint.
Count III of the Amended Complaint - "Use of Taxpayer Funds for a Special
Election for'Ordinance 5781 Constitutes an Illegal Exaction and Should be
Prohibited"
Plaintiffs allege that the use of taxpayer funds for the special election on
Ordinance 5781 constitutes an illegal exaction. Summary judgment is

as to

Count III of the Amended Complaint for the reasons asserted by the defendants.
Count IV of the Amended Complaint - "Ordinance 5781 is Unlawful as it Directly
Violates Arkansas Code Annotated§ 14-1-403; Arkansas Code Annotated§ 14-43610; and Arkansas Code Annotated§ 16-123-107."
The plaintiffs and the State allege that Ordinance 5781 is unlawful because it
vfolates Arkansas Code Annotated§ 14-1-403 ("Act 137"). Defendants argue that
Ordinance 5781 does not violate Act 137 or, in the alternative, Act 137 is
3

unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution. All parties have moved for summary
judgment on Count IV of the Amended Complaint.
Act 137 provides that counties, municipalities, and any other political
/1

subdivisions of the State of Arkansas shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance ...
that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not
contained in state law." Ark. Code Ann.§ 14-1-403(a).
First Prong of Act 137
The first prong of Act 137 prohibits the City of Fayetteville from adopting or
enforcing an ordinance that creates a protected classification on a basis not
contained in state law. Defendants argue that Ordinance 5781 does not create any
such classification because gender identity and sexual orientation were ·
classifications protected on bases contained in state law prior to the adoption of
Ordinance 5781.
In support of this argument, the defendants first point to a statute titled
11

Antibullying policies" which ensures that students and public school employees

are reasonably free from substantial intimidation, harassment, or harm of threat by
students. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514(a). Protected classifications under the
statute include gender identity and sexual orientation. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 6-18-514I(b)(l) and (c).
4

Defendants also point to the Arkansas Domestic Peace Act, which requires
that every shelter for victims of domestic violence develop and implement a written
nondiscrimlli.ation policy to provide services without regard to race, religion, color,
age, marital status, national origin, ancestry or sexual preference. See Ark. Code

Ann.§ 9-4-106.
Finally,· the defendants note that Arkansas law provides that the official state
issued birth certificate shall be amended to show a transgender person's inherent
gender as opposed to the sex assigned at birth upon proper and legal
documentation: See Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-18-307(d).
Thus, the defendants assert that gender identity and sexual orientation were
already protected classifications on bases contained in state law prior to Ordinance
5781's adoption and,

Ordinance 5781 did not create any protected

classifications in violation of Act 137.
Plaintiffs and the State respond that the only protected classifications to be
considered here are those in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (" ACRA") and that
gender identity and sexual orientation are not protected classifications under the
ACRA. The ACRA, however, is not mentioned in Act 137.
Our supreme court has stated:
When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we keep in mind that
the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to
construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
5

accepted meaning in common language. When the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of
statutory construction. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to
two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its
meaning. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning,
and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent
must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. This
court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary
to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or
omission has circumvented legislative intent.

Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 469-470 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
The language of this first prong of Act 137 is plain and unambiguous and the
court must construe it just as it reads, giving the language used its plain meaning.
Act 137 does not state that Arkansas's municipalities are prohibited from creating a
protected classification on a basis not contained in the ACRA. Rather, Act 137 states
that Arkansas prohibits its municipalities from creating a protected classification "on
a basis not contained in state law." Ark. Code Ann.§ 14-1-403(a). Clearly, the
classifications of gender identity and sexual orientation were classifications of
persons protected on bases contained in state law prior to the enactment of
Ordinance 5781. As such, Ordinance 5781 does not create a protected classification
on a basis not contained in state law and, therefore, the ordinance does not violate
the plain meaning of the language used in the first prong of Act 137.
Second Prong of Act 137
The State ':lrgues that the word "basis" contained in the second prong of the
6

"Prohibited conduct" section. of Act 137 (prohibiting discrimination on a basis not
contained in state law) refers to the area of law in which a prohibition of
discrimination is contained, such as, specifically, discrimination in the area of
employment law. Defendants respond that the word "basis" contained in the second
prong means the reason why a person is discriminated against, such as their gender
identity or sexual orientation.
Construing Act 137 just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
accepted meanfug in common language, the court believes the defendants'
.

\

interpretation is most likely that intended by the legislature. No definition of the
word "basis" is.provided in the act,

and the court does not find the State's

interpretation entii'ely umeasonable. As such, the court finds the second prong of
the statute open to more than one construction and, thus, ambiguous. See Simpson v.
Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 2014 Ark. 363 (2014).

When a statute is ambiguous, the court must interpret it according to
legislative intent. Id. When interpreting legislative intent, our supreme court has
instructed that courts should perform an examination of the whole act and reconcile
provisions of the whole act to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an
effort to give effect to every part. Id. In addition, the supreme court "must look at
the legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved." Id.
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. Act 137 reads in its entirety as follows:
AN ACT TO AMEND THE LAW CONCERNING ORDINANCES OF
CITIES AND COUNTIES BY CREATING THE INTRASTATE COMMERCE
IMPROVEMENT ACT; TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Subtitle

TO AMEND THE LAW CONCERNING ORDINANCES OF CITIES AND
COUNTIES BY CREATING THE INTRASTATE IMPROVEMENT ACT AND
TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code Title 14, Chapter 1, is amended to add an
additional subchapter to read as follows:
Subchapter 4 - Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act
14-1-401. Title.
This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Intrastate Commerce
Improvement Act".
14-1-402. Purpose - Finding.
(a) The purpose of this subchapter is to improve intrastate commerce by
ensuring that businesses, organizations, and employers doing business in the
state are subject to uniform nondiscrimination laws and obligations, regardless
of the counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions in which the
businesses, organizations, and employers are located or engage in business or
commercial activity.
(b) The General Assembly finds that uniformity of law benefits the businesses,
organizations, and employers seeking to do business in the state and attracts
new businesses, organizations, and employers to the state.
14-1-403. Prohibited conduct.
(a) A county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall not
adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a
8

protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in
state law.
(b) This section does not apply to a rule or policy that pertains only to the
of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision.

Ark Code Ann.§ 14-1-401-403 ("Act 13711 ).
The State argues that taking into consideration the written purpose and
legislative findings of Act 137, the basis referred to in the second prong of the act
should be interpreted as referring to "employment discrimination, busfu.esses and
employers." State's argument at January 26, 2016, hearing. In response to the
defendants' asserted meaning of the word "basis" in the second prong, the State
argues, "[t]hat' snot "Yhat the plain language means. [W]hat it really means is that
you can't prohibit in a different way than state law already pro!l1bits." Id.
While trying to reconcile provis,ions of the whole act to make them consistent,
harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part, the court must
also look to the legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved in
making this determination. As to the language of Act 137, the written purpose by
no means requires such a leap by this court as to insert language into the operative
section of the act as the State suggests. The "Prohibited conduct" section does not
state that a municipality shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance that prohibits
discrimination "in the area of employment law," for example, and the legislature
should have used such a phrase instead of the word "basis" if that is what the
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legislature intended. The court must still consider the ordinary and usual meaning
of the language, and to insert the language requested by the State into the statute ·
where the plain language reads otherwise is beyond the scope of this court's
authority. Although the court has acknowledged that the State's asserted
interpretation is not entirely unreasonable, this court will not go so far as to insert
language into a statute in place of other existing language.
Nor can any evidence be found in the legislative history to support the State's
assertion of the meaning of the word "basis" in the second prong of Act 137's
"Prohibited conduct" section. The legislative history available consists of floor
debate and other statements made by the house and senate bills' sponsors of Act
137 and relates solely to the issue of discrimfuation against Arkansas citizens based
on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Nothing relating to the written
purpose of Act 137 is found anywhere in the legislative history, and certainly
nothing is found to give credence to the State's assertion that the word "basis"
should be replaced with language such as "the area of employment law
discrimination."
As noted, our supreme court has stated, "This court is very hesitant to
interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is
clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent." Farrell,
365 Ark. at 470. Upon examination of Act 137 as a whole, including the legislative
10

intent, there is no indication that any drafting error or omission has circumvented
the legislative intent.
The plain language of Act 137 is clear, even more so after an examination of
the act as a whole. The term "basis" contained in the second prong of the
"Prohibited conduct'' section of the act means the same as it does in the first prong:
the reason why a person is discriminated against, not the area of law in which such
discrimination occurs. Thus, just as the first prong of the "Prohibited conduct''
section of Act 137 fails to prohibit the City of Fayetteville from adopting and
enforcing Ordinance 5781, so must the second. The ordinance prohibits
discrimination on bases already contained in state law, in compliance with Act 137.
For these reasons, Ordinance 5781 does not violate Act 137. Because
j

Ordinance 5781 is found not to violate Act 137, the court need not address the
constitutionality of Act 137. Defendants are granted summary judgment as to
Count IV of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' and the State's cross-motions for
summary judgment are denied.
Count V of the Amended Complaint - "Ordinance 5781 is Unlawful as it Directly
Violates Article ll, § 24 of the Arkansas Constitution."
In Count V of the Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs claim that the

defendants intentionally omitted "the ·protection of the right of conscience" when
passing Ordinance 5781 and that such omission violates Article II, Section 24 of the
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Arkansas Constitution. For the reasons asserted by the defendants, summary
judgment is granted as to Count V of the Amended Complaint.
Count VI of the Amended Complaint - "Ordinance 5781 Violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983"
Count VI of the Amended Complaint alleges that Ordinance 5781 is intended
to deprive citizens and other persons in the City of Fayetteville of their rights,
privileges and immunities by denying them the protected classification of freedom of
religion under Arkansas Code Annotated§ 16-123-102(8) of the Arkansas Civil
Rights Act of 1993, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. For the reasons argued by the defendants, summary judgment is
granted as to Count VI of the Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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